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ABSTRACT PAGE
C olum bus’ renow ned 1492 voyage m arked the beginning of S p a in ’s  q u est to reach  the fabled 
riches of Asia by sailing w est ra ther than  eas t. Eighty years  later, C olum bus’ dream  of 
establish ing a w esterly trade  route to C hina w as ach ieved  with the founding of S pan ish  Manila. 
Within a few  short d ec a d e s , millions of p e s o s ’ worth of New World silver and Asian goods 
flowed annually ac ro ss  the  Pacific via the  Manila G alleon trade network. H istorians have not 
neglected  the  su dden  rise of transpacific com m erce  in the  late sixteenth-century. W oodrow  
Borah, William L. Schurz, O.H.K. S p a te , and  o ther notable tw entieth-century sch o lars  w ere all 
draw n to the topic. While m ore recently, econom ic historians have focused  attention on the 
direct flow of New World silver to Asia from the sixteenth to n ineteen th-centuries. This 
scholarship  how ever, h a s  failed to offer a truly global accoun t of the Manila G alleon’s im pact 
on patterns of consum ption in S pan ish  Am erica, S pan ish  imperial policy making, or global 
trad e  patterns. With the  goal of fostering m ore com prehensive  and  interdisciplinary research  
on early m odern transpacific trade, this p ap er s itu a tes  the  early developm ent of the  Manila 
G alleon within a global m arket fram ew ork. In con trast to p as t scholarship, which h a s  focused  
predom inantly on Pacific silver flows to Asia, a global m arket fram ework explains the  rapid 
developm ent of transpacific trade  in the  late 1500s a s  a  co n seq u en ce  of the com plim entary 
dem and  for silver in China and  im ported com m odities in Span ish  Am erican m arkets. By 
drawing on w orld-system s analysis, C h inese  econom ic history, P o rtu g u ese  and  Span ish  
imperial history, along with E uropean , Asian, and  colonial Latin Am erican historiography, this 
p ap e r cha llenges existing narratives of the Manila Galleon by exam ining S pan ish  Am erican 
m arket a s  im portant s ites  of both the production and  consum ption of global com m odities. In 
doing so, it identifies future a v en u es  o f re sea rch  regarding the im pact of transpacific 
com m erce on historical developm ents in colonial Latin Am erica specifically and  the  early 
m odern trading world m ore generally.
Table o f  Contents
Introduction 1
A Note on Sources 4
The Colorful Curio: Historiography of the Manila Galleon 6
Beyond Silver Flows 13
The Structure of Sixteenth Century Spanish Atlantic Trade 23
The Structure of Early Colonial Trade 30
The Birth o f Transpacific Trade 33
Early Commercial Expansion: 1571 — 1586 37
Commercial Expansion and Rivalry 49
Galleons in a Silver Sink: 1586 — 1604 56
Regulating the Pacific 70
An Early Modem Pacific World? 76
Conclusion 94
Bibliography 103
1
Introduction
“It seems to me that one of the good and most important businesses in this land [the New World] is merchandise, 
for in that are the true mines, beyond what one can believe. .. The profit is so sure and so large that a well stocked 
shop here is the richest thing in the world, alchemy itself ” —Juan Pelaez de Berrio, alcalde mayor of Oaxaca, 
15291
‘This [the discovery of the sea route from the Philippines to New Spain] is a great and very important 
achievement; and the people of Mexico are very proud of their discovery, which they think will make them the 
center of the world. Unknown Author, Letter to Miguel Salvador of Valencia
Columbus’ renowned 1492 voyage marked the beginning of Spain’s quest'to reach the 
fabled riches of Asia by sailing west rather than east. As is commonly known, the Genoese 
navigator failed to reach Cathay, finding the way blocked by the vast continental landmasses of 
North and South America. Despite the initial failure to discover a direct westerly route to Asia, 
Spanish monarchs did not abandon the search for such a course. While conquistadores spent 
much of the half century following Columbus’ first voyage conquering and consolidating control 
over large sections of Central and South America, the Spanish Crown continued to fund voyages 
o f exploration, the most celebrated being Magellan’s circumnavigation of the globe in 1521.
Forty years later, the Crown of Castile succeeded in gaining a foothold in Asia through the 
establishment of a small colony in the Philippine Islands. By 1571, Columbus’ dream of 
establishing a direct, westerly trade route to China was achieved with the founding of Spanish
1 Quoted in Peter Bakewell, A  History o f Latin America to 1825, Third Edition (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2010), 253-254.
Emma Blair and James Robertson, eds. The Philippine Islands 1493 - 1898, Volume II  (Cleveland: A.H.
Clark, 1903-1909), “Letter to Miguel Salvador o f Valencia”, 226.
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Manila. However, it was not Europe that was now directly linked to a commercially expanding 
Asia but rather the increasingly silver-rich and chronically undersupplied markets of the New 
World. Within a few short decades, millions o f pesos’ worth of New World silver and Asian, 
principally Chinese, goods, flowed annually across the Pacific via the Manila Galleon or ‘nao de 
la China’ trade network. Would these Asian goods find their way to European consumers or 
would they be absorbed by the emerging markets of Spanish America? This was soon a major 
question facing powerful Spanish merchants and royal authorities. How it was answered is the 
main topic of this thesis.
Historians have not neglected the sudden rise of transpacific trade in the late sixteenth 
and early seventeenth centuries. Woodrow Borah, William L. Schurz, O.H.K. Spate, and other 
notable twentieth-century scholars were all drawn to the topic. More recendy, economic 
historians have shed new light on the Manila Galleon through their efforts to estimate the 
amount of New World silver being shipped directly to Asia from the sixteenth to nineteenth 
centuries. This scholarship, however, has failed to offer a truly global assessment of the Manila 
Galleon’s impact on shipping routes, markets, and patterns of consumption and production 
throughout Spanish America and the early modern trading world in general. Its emphasis has 
been bullion flows. Nor have these new studies taken into account the efforts of Spanish, 
Portuguese, and Chinese merchants to create a transpacific commercial network and the 
corresponding push by the Spanish Crown to control and ultimately suppress such a 
development in the late sixteenth century.
The aim of this thesis is not to provide an exhaustive, global history of Spanish 
transpacific trade, but rather to situate the early development of the Manila Galleon exchange 
system within a global market framework, emphasizing sites of consumption. In doing so it seeks 
to focus scholarly attention on the flow of Asian commodities to Spanish America and the 
impact of these goods on colonial markets, merchant activity, patterns of consumption, and
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Spanish imperial policy making. In contrast to prior research, this thesis will seek to explain the 
rapid expansion of the Manila Galleon trade network in late 1500s in terms of the 
complementary demand for silver in Asia and imported commodities in Spanish American 
markets. In doing so, it examines how the opening of transpacific trade impacted more than 
global bullion flows. While its affect was felt on commerce through Southeast Asia, the Atlantic, 
and Indian Oceans, the Manila Galleon transformed inter colonial trade networks in Spanish 
America by introducing large quantities of Asian commodities into colonial markets. This 
development altered consumption patterns throughout Spanish America and threatened to 
undermine the Consulado of Seville’s monopoly over colonial markets and the royal finances of 
the Crown of Castile. Therefore, within the global market framework presented here, Spanish 
American markets will be examined as important centers not only for the production of silver 
but the consumption of global commodities.
The focal point of this study will be the roughly three and a half decades between 1571 
and 1604. Together, these correspond to the establishment o f Spanish Manila and the year in 
which numerous cedulas issued by Philip II and Philip III concerning transpacific commerce were 
compiled and reissued as a single decree. The 1604 compilation formed the basis of a 
comprehensive regulatory policy governing transpacific commerce that remained almost 
unchanged for two centuries. The historical developments to be examined within this period will 
center first on the role of Spanish, Portuguese, and Chinese merchants in the rapid expansion of 
transpacific trade in the late sixteenth-century and the effect of this commerce on markets and 
patterns of consumption in the Americas and beyond. Second, it examines how such 
developments awoke in the Spanish Crown an increasing anxiety over the drain of New World 
silver to Asia and the flow of Asian commodities to Spanish American markets. Together, these 
flows threatened to undermine the Crown’s ability to continuously exploit its American colonies 
in order to bankroll imperial ambitions in continental Europe and the Mediterranean basin.
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To explore the above themes, this study will begin with an overview of the 
historiography of the Manila Galleon before introducing a new, global market framework for the 
study of early modern transpacific trade. Having delineated this framework, an outline of Asian 
and Spanish American economic development during the late 1500s will be presented. From 
there, a more in-depth portrayal of Spanish Adantic and inter-Pacific colonial trade will be 
provided for the same period with special emphasis on the ways in which the Spanish Crown 
regulated this commerce for its own financial benefit. Finally, the study will examine, through a 
narrative format utilizing primary sources in translation, the expansion of transpacific trade and 
its impact on economic, social, and political developments within East Asia, the New World, and 
Spain throughout the last third of the sixteenth century.
As the research presented here is based on a rather limited review of primary documents 
and in fact borrows heavily from prior research, it cannot nor does it seek to offer firm 
conclusions to the questions raised. Challenging existing narratives of the Manila Galleon trade 
and enlarging the scope of analysis will, however, help to identify unanswered questions 
regarding the ways transpacific trade impacted historical developments in Spanish America 
specifically, and the early modern trading world more generally. The ultimate aim of this paper is, 
therefore, the mapping out of a more comprehensive and interdisciplinary research plan that 
identifies future avenues of research and primary source material that can help to broaden and 
deepen the history of early modern transpacific trade.
A N ote  on Sources
The majority of primary sources referenced here are letters and reports written by colonial 
officials or ecclesiastics serving in Spain, Spanish Manila, the viceroyalties of New Spain and 
Peru, and various Portuguese trading outposts throughout Asia. Most of these documents were
5
translated into English and published in Emma Blair and James Robertson’s multi-volume 
collection, The Philippine Islands 1493 — 1803. This fifty-five volume collection of primary 
documents relating to Spain’s colonial presence in the Philippines was published between the 
years 1903 and 1909. Since then, it has been heavily cited by scholars and remains an 
indispensable source for those conducting research on Spanish colonial rule in the Philippines 
and the Manila Galleon trade network.
Despite its heavy use by historians, it must be recognized that Blair and Robertson’s 
collection presents a predominantly Western or more specifically Spanish point of view on the 
colonial Philippines and transpacific trade. The voices of Filipinos or other non-Spanish 
individuals rarely surface in the selected documents nor those of Spanish, Portuguese, or Asian 
merchants involved in transpacific commerce. Furthermore, the collection is heavily composed 
of official reports and letters to the king of Spain, which convey information on the state of 
Spanish colonial rule in the Philippines and Asia in general. In regards to the Manila Galleon 
specifically, this results in what is often conflicting information from two or more authors. For 
the period in question, 1571-1604, there were those in favor of a general expansion of 
transpacific trade and those against it. Individual authors of various reports and letters also 
sought to curry favor with the king and advance their own personal interests. As a result, 
historians must weigh conflicting viewpoints against one another and ultimately decide who is 
being more truthful.
Admittedly, the reliance on documents in the Blair and Robertson collection limits the 
scope of this research. While the Manila Galleon is examined within a global framework, the 
early history of the trade route is ultimately told here from the view-point of the Spanish crown, 
the Consulado of Seville, and various colonial officials. Because of this, definitive conclusions on 
the quantitative and qualitative impact of transpacific trade on trade routes, markets, and patterns 
of consumption in Spanish America and the early modern trading world cannot be offered.
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However, for the purpose of this study, presenting a new framework for examining early modern 
transpacific trade, the Blair and Robertson collection provides a large and important set of 
documents that can help to outline future avenues of research that can address the historical 
questions raised here.
The Colorful Curio: H istoriography o f the Manila Galleon
While the Manila Galleon may be regarded as, in the words of Peter Coclanis, a 
“colorful curio or, at best a sideshow” of Latin American history, there is a significant 
historiography of the famous 'nao de la China' trade network.3 Many of the principal works date 
from the mid-twentieth century, however, with most subsequent scholarship offering few 
significant additions or radically new interpretations. William Schurz’s The Manila Galleon, 
published in 1939, remains the definitive and only full-length study on transpacific trade for the 
early modern period. Schurz was neither the first nor the last scholar to publish archive-based 
research on the Manila Galleon, but like him, most historians have examined the development of 
transpacific commerce within traditional frameworks such as colonial Latin American, Spanish 
Imperial, or less frequently, East Asian or Pacific economic history 4 Most research has also 
focused predominantly on the westward flow of American silver to Asia at the expense of more 
detailed research on the eastward trade in Asian commodities. As result, the Manila Galleon has
3 Peter Coclanis, “Pacific Overtures: The Spanish Lake and the Global Economy, 1500-1800,” Common- 
Place 5, no. 2 (January 2005): 1.
4 See William Schurz, The Manila Galleon (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1939). Woodrow Borah, Early Colonial 
Trade and Navigation Between Mexico and Peru (Los Angeles, CA: University o f California Press, 1954). C.H. 
Haring, Trade and Navigation Between Spain and the Indies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1918). 
O.H.K. Spate, The Pacific Since Magellan Vol. 1: The Spanish Take (Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota 
Press, 1979). Nicholas Cushner, Spain in the Philippines (Manila: Ateno de Manila University, 1971). 
Katharine Bjork, “The Link That Kept the Philippines Spanish: Mexican Merchant Interests and the 
Manila Trade, 1571-1815,” Journal of World History 9, no, 1 (1998): 25-50. Guillermina Del Valle Pavon, 
“Los Mercaderes de Mexico: la Transgresion de los Limites al Comercio Pacifico en Nueva Espana, 1550- 
1620,” Pjevista de Historia 23 (2005): 213-240.
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not been examined within a comprehensive global framework that gives equal weight to the flow 
of New World silver to Asia and the corresponding flow of Asian commodities to Spanish 
American markets.
Despite being focused on early modern Spanish Atlantic trade, C.H. Haring’s Trade and 
Navigation Between Spain and the Indies and The Spanish Empire In America offer a limited discussion 
of the development and impact of the Manila Galleon. Following the establishment of Spanish 
Manila, Haring noted, “it was soon realized that an opening was afforded for the introduction 
into Spanish America of oriental [goods]...to the great advantage of the colonial consumer.” 
While there is litde substantive discussion concerning the variety or overall amount of such 
merchandise flowing to colonial markets, Haring argues that by the late sixteenth century, 
transpacific commerce caused a decline in Atlantic trade levels.5 Although the rapid development 
and impact of transpacific commerce is recognized in both works, the Manila Galleon is 
examined within a Spanish Imperial framework that emphasizes its affect on Spanish 
transatlantic trade and Spanish colonial policy making.
Still, the definitive work on the Manila Galleon trade route is William Schurz’s The 
Manila Galleon, a compelling, if somewhat romantic account of the routes roughly two and a half 
centuries of history. Unlike Haring, Schurz examined Spanish transpacific trade within a largely 
Pacific framework. By focusing on the Pacific as opposed to Spanish America or the Spanish 
Atlantic, The Manila Galleon presented an outline of the multiple trade routes linking Spanish 
Manila to markets throughout Asia and the Americas. Schurz’s research on the flow of Asian 
commodities to Spanish America was also more extensive than anything before and arguably 
since. Despite his description of Spanish Manila as a trading emporium by the early 1600s, 
however, Schurz focused attention on the flow of Chinese silk to Spanish American markets. He 
went so far as to label the Manila Galleons as “above all...silk ships [because] silks in every stage
5 C.H. Haring, Trade and Navigation Between Spain and the Indies, 45.
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of manufacture and of every variety of weave and pattern formed the most valuable part of their 
cargoes.”6 Having identified raw silk and silk textiles as the largest and most valuable of 
eastbound cargo emanating from the Philippines, Schurz explains the heavy regulation of the 
Manila Galleon in 1604 by the need to safeguard Seville’s transatlantic trade in textiles.7 Although 
a pioneering study, the heavy focus on Chinese silk and the broad scope of Schurz’s research 
ultimately resulted in a limited discussion of transpacific trade’s impact on Spanish American 
trade routes and patterns of consumption.
Like Schurz’s The Manila Galleon, Woodrow Borah’s Early Colonial Trade and Navigation 
Between Mexico and Peru was a pioneering work that remains the definitive study on its subject 
matter. In it, the development and structure of sixteenth century commerce between the 
viceroyalties of New Spain and Peru is examined. Borah argues that the establishment of the 
Manila Galleon route led to a dramatic increase in the volume and value of inter-colonial trade. 
While regular commerce between New Spain and Peru had existed since the 1500s, it remained 
relatively limited until increasing quantities of Asian goods began arriving in Acapulco in the late 
1570s. Along with Harry E. Cross, Borah is one of the only scholars to provide quantitative 
estimates for the annual value of in ter-colonial trade during the sixteenth and early seventeenth
^ • 8 centuries.
Building in part on Schurz’s, and to a lesser extent Borah’s work, O.H.K. Spate placed 
the Manila Galleon trade network within a larger history of the early modern Pacific in his 
ambitious The Pacific Since Magellan, Vol. 1: The Spanish Take. Spate’s work examined the 
development of maritime relations between Asia and the Americas during the sixteenth century.
6 William Schurz, The Manila Galleon, 32.
7 “a strong movement was set on foot in Spain to limit or ban altogether the importation o f  Chinese 
silks... [and a] system o f  restrictive legislation was instituted, with the object o f limiting the volume o f silks 
which the galleons might carry.” William Schurz, The Manila Galleon, 32.
8 See Harry E. Cross, “South American Bullion Production and Export, 1550-1750,” in J.F. Richards, ed., 
Precious Metals in the Tater Medieval and Early Modem Worlds (Durham, NC: Caroline Academic Press, 1983), 
397-424.
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As the title suggests, the focus of the work was on the creation of a Pacific commercial space by 
European, specifically Spanish and, to a lesser degree, Portuguese voyages of exploration, 
conquest, and trade. The role of the Manila Galleon trade network occupies a central place in 
this history and a considerable part of The Spanish Take is devoted to examining its early 
development. Spate elaborates more fully than Schurz on commercial contacts between Spanish 
Manila and the wider Asian trading zone. At the same time, a more complete picture of eastern 
Pacific trade networks linking Spanish American colonies to the Manila Galleon trade route is 
outlined. The importance of New World silver in transpacific commerce leads Spate to also 
devote significant attention to the emergence of silver mining in Spanish America. While the 
eastern flow of Asian commodities to Spanish America is not neglected, Spate focuses more 
attention on the westward trade in silver and the impact this had on the Spanish crown’s effort 
to gain control over transpacific commerce in the late 1500s.
While the work of Schurz and Spate broadened the study of the Manila Galleon beyond 
the Spanish imperial or the Spanish American framework utilized by Haring and Borah, a truly 
global approach was still wanting. Over the course of the last two decades, however, the 
economic historians Dennis Flynn and Arturo Giraldez have begun the process of globalizing 
the study of early modern transpacific trade. Unlike earlier historians of the Manila Galleon, they 
approached transpacific trade from the standpoint of an Asian, specifically Chinese-centered 
early modern global economy as opposed to a Eurocentric model. The main crux of the 
argument made by scholars in favor of an Asian-centric framework is the tendency of silver to 
gravitate towards Asia throughout the early modern period. For Flynn and Giraldez, along with 
Richard von Glahn and the late Andre Gunder Frank among others, the tendency of silver to 
flow towards Asia was caused primarily by the high demand for silver bullion in China.
Utilizing a sinocentric model of the early modern global economy based on global silver 
flows, Flynn and Giraldez argued that larger amounts of New World silver traveled along
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transpacific trade routes from the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries than had been acknowledged 
by earlier historians. As a result, the overall value of the Manila Galleon trade is now recognized 
as being higher than previous estimates, but by how much remains a contentious issue.9 
According to Flynn and Giraldez, an average of two million pesos’, or 50 tons’ worth of New 
World silver flowed annually through Manila on its way to Asian markets. In comparison, during 
the seventeenth century European merchants shipped an estimated 50 tons of silver to Asia each 
year via the Cape Route.10
To back up their two million peso estimate, Flynn and Giraldez relied heavily on stock 
demand monetary theory as opposed to quantitative data on New World silver production and 
export. Within this theoretical model, currency, in this case silver bullion, is traded like any other 
global commodity. It responds to market forces and will gravitate towards those markets where it 
is most highly valued. For most of the early modern period, Asian markets, specifically that of 
China, valued silver higher than those of Europe or Spanish America. In the late 1500s, silver 
was priced nearly twice as high in Canton as it was in Seville.11 By the mid seventeenth century, 
Chinese political and economic instability caused the value of silver to fall, reaching parity with 
Europe in the 1640s. After mid-century however, prices began to diverge once more and by the 
early 1700s silver was valued fifty percent higher in Canton.12 Using stock demand monetary 
theory, Flynn and Giraldez therefore argue that the vast majority of American silver that was not
9 For an overview o f this debate see Richard Garner, “Where Did All the Silver Go? Bullion Outflows
1570-1650: A Review o f  the Numbers and the Absence o f Numbers,” Economic History Data Desk, 
https://hom e.comcast.net/~richardgarner007/Pubs/NetDraft-SilverGoRev.pdf (accessed May 21, 2010).
10 See Dennis Flynn and Arturo Giraldez, “Born with a ‘Silver Spoon’: The Origins o f World Trade in 
1571,” Journal of World History 6, no. 2 (Fall 1995): 201-221. Dennis Flynn and Arturo Giraldez, “Arbitrage, 
China, and World Trade in the Early Modern Period,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 
38, No. 4 (1995): 429-448.
11 “gold was exchanged for silver in Canton at the rate o f 1:5.5 to 1:7, while in Spain the exchange rate was 
1:12.5 to 1:14, thus indicating that the value o f silver was twice as high in China as in Spain.” Pierre 
Chaunu, Ees Philippines et le Pacifique des Iberiques (Paris : Sevpen, 1960), 2.
12 “A fifty percent premium [on silver] existed this time, rather than the one hundred percent premium 
during the 1540-1640 period.” Dennis Flynn and Arturo Giraldez. “Cycles o f Silver, Global Economic 
Unity Through the Mid-Eighteenth Century,” Journal of World History 13, no. 2 (Fall 2002): 395.
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remitted to Europe between the late sixteenth and early nineteenth century flowed across the
Pacific owning to the strong demand for and price of silver in Asian markets.
The use of stock demand monetary theory and a sinocentric economic framework
resulted in Flynn and Giraldez’s research being narrowly focused on the flow of New World
silver directly to Asia via the Manila Galleon trade route. This in turn has led them argue that the
rapid expansion of transpacific commerce after 1571 was driven largely by the high demand for
silver in China. In the end, Flynn and Giraldez’s largely one-dimensional focus on bullion flows
has offered little concerning the impact of transpacific commerce on historical developments
outside of the global production and exchange of silver. Nonetheless, their research has helped
to globalize the history of the Manila Galleon while demonstrating its importance in terms of the
early modern silver trade.
While Flynn and Giraldez’s research has brought renewed attention to early modern
transpacific trade, their two million pesos a year average has been challenged. Scholars such as
Richard Garner argue that while their estimate may be true for the entire history of the Manila
Galleon, it distorts the size and significance of transpacific trade for the time period being
studied here, 1571 to 1604. Garner instead argues that in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth
centuries, the annual value of transpacific trade fluctuated widely and rarely, if ever, approached
an average of two million pesos. Using historical data on silver production and bullion exports
from the New World that was not available to Flynn and Giraldez, Garner instead argued that an
13annual average of 700,000 pesos flowed to Spanish Manila between 1569 and 1647.
In the end, Flynn and Giraldez’s figures may be too high when compared to the 
historical data available for the period 1571 to 1604. As Garner pointed out, however, 
documents pertaining to New World silver production and export must be approached with 
skepticism. Furthermore, contraband trading was endemic in both Atlantic and Pacific
13 Richard Garner, “Where Did All the Silver Go?,” 17.
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commerce and there existed a significant level of illegal, unminted silver circulating within the 
colonial markets of Spanish America. Therefore, the precise annual value of silver shipped to 
Asia via the Manila Galleon trade route will, in all likelihood, never be known. For the purpose 
of the research here, it will be assumed that by the 1590s, annual transpacific silver flows 
fluctuated between Gamer’s low estimate o f 700,000 and Flynn and Giraldez’s high of two 
millions pesos.
Other recent scholarly contributions to the existing historiography of the Manila 
Galleon include research by Katharine Bjork and Guillermina Del Valle Pavon. In the article 
“The Link that Kept the Philippines Spanish: Mexican Merchant Interests and the Manila Trade,
1571-1815”, Bjork argues that the Philippines should be viewed more as a colony of New Spain 
rather than of Spain. This work is significant in that, like Flynn and Giraldez’s research, it rejects 
Immanuel Wallerstein’s core/periphery model of the European world- system to explain 
transpacific trade. Instead, Bjork argued that the Manila Galleon was affected by the interests of 
Mexican merchant elites and “the dynamics of a global economy driven by Asian products and 
practices.” 14 In “Los Mercaderes de Mexico Y la Transgresion de los Limites al Comercio 
Pacifico en Nueva Espana, 1550-1620,” del Valle Pavon examines the reasoning behind the 
severe regulation of the Manila Galleon in the late 1500s. Highlighting Philip II’s financial 
difficulties, she contends that the main reason for the heavy suppression of transpacific trade was 
to prevent the further drain of silver to Asia.15 While this argument is not necessarily new, 
compared to previous research, Del Valle Pavon provided a more detailed investigation of the 
rationale behind the Crown’s regulation of the Manila Galleon.
The works reviewed here by no means represent an exhaustive account of scholarly 
research on the Manila Galleon. They do, however, present an adequate sketch of how the study
14 Katharine Bjork, “The Link That Kept the Philippines Spanish,” 25-50.
15 Guillermina Del Valle Pavon, “Los Mercaderes de Mexico la Transgresion de los Limites al Comercio 
Pacifico en Nueva Espana,” 213-240.
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of early modern transpacific trade has developed over time. Today, largely because of the work 
of Flynn and Giraldez, the Manila Galleon has been situated within a global framework, albeit 
one narrowly focused on early modern silver flows. Silver bullion was an integral component of 
transpacific trade throughout the early modern period. However, New World silver, whether one 
treats it as a commodity or currency, represents only one side of the proverbial coin. The 
overwhelming focus on silver within the historiography of the Manila Galleon has left questions 
concerning the flow of Asian commodities to Spanish American markets unanswered. To what 
extent, for example, did the demand for imported commodities by Spanish American consumers 
drive the initial expansion of transpacific trade in the late 1500s? What type and quantity of Asian 
wares were shipped to the New World? Were such goods consumed largely by colonial elites or 
did indigenous, African, and laboring-class Spanish and Creole consumers also purchase Asian 
imports on a regular basis? And finally, how significant of a threat to Seville’s monopoly over 
colonial markets and the Spanish crown’s finances was sixteenth century transpacific commerce? 
To answer these and other questions, a more comprehensive, global framework that treats 
Spanish American markets as sites of production and consumption is sorely needed in order to 
broaden and deepen the history of early modern transpacific trade.
Beyond Silver Flows
At its heart, the historical narrative of the Manila Galleon is a quintessential global story. 
N ot only did it bridge the world’s largest body of water to directiy connect Asia and the 
Americas, it transformed commerce in both the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. In terms of policy, 
the rapid expansion of transpacific trade after 1571 forced the Spanish Crown to confront the 
difficulties of governing and maintaining both economic and political control over the world’s 
first truly global empire. To begin to understand, let alone tell such a story, requires an
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interdisciplinary approach that draws from European, Asian, colonial Latin American, and 
Atlantic historiography (plus Art History and Archeology), along with more specialized fields 
such as world-systems analysis, Chinese economic history, and Portuguese and Spanish imperial 
history among others. Therefore, while certain aspects of the Manila Galleon trade may be 
examined within more traditional historical frameworks, arriving at a more comprehensive 
understanding of how the opening of transpacific commerce impacted global economic, political, 
and social developments requires an entirely different frame of analysis.
The global market framework advocated here for the study of the Manila Galleon draws 
heavily from recent developments in world-systems analysis and global economic history. Over 
the last two decades, the argument of both Fernand Braudel and Immanuel Wallerstein that 
capitalism was invented in sixteenth-century Europe and that Europe expanded outwards to 
organize the world around itself during the early modern era has come under increasing scrutiny. 
16 Scholars such as Richard von Glahn and the aforementioned Dennis Flynn and Arturo 
Giraldez, have argued that in terms of global silver flows, the early modern global economy was 
organized around China.17 Therefore, it was the high demand for silver in China that drove the 
increase in global trade throughout the early modern era and not European expansion. While 
European merchants played an increasingly important role in global commerce during this 
period, they were essentially middlemen, facilitating the flow of American silver to Asia in 
exchange for various Asian commodities. Building in part on this research, Andre Gunder Frank,
16 See Fernand Braudel, Civilisation and Capitalism 15th-18th Century, Volumes 1 - 3 (New York: Harper & Row 
Publishers Inc, 1979). Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modem World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of 
the World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York: Academic Press Inc, 1976) and WorId-Systems Analysis 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004).
17 See Dennis Flynn and Arturo Giraldez, “Born with a Silver Spoon”; “Arbitrage, China, and World 
Trade in the Early Modern Period”; “Cycles o f Silver”. Also see Richard von Glahn. Fountain of Fortune: 
Money and Monetary Polity in China 1000-1700 (Berkeley, CA: University o f California Press, 1996), and 
“Money Use in China and Changing Patterns o f Global Trade in Monetary Metals, 1500-1800,” in Global 
Connections and Monetary Histoy, 1470-1800, ed. Dennis Flynn, Arturo Giraldez, and Richard von Glahn 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003), 187-201.
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James Blaut, and Janet L. Abu-Lughod among others, advanced the argument that a world
economy existed prior to the beginning of Europe’s overseas expansion in the fifteenth century
18and that it remained centered on Asia for the entirety of the early modern period. Kenneth 
Pomeranz and K, N. Chaudhuri have also argued that prior to the nineteenth century industrial 
revolution in Europe, many regions of China and Asia in general, were more economically 
developed and “capitalist” than Europe.19
While the case for an Asian or sinocentric early modern global economy raises 
important questions concerning Eurocentrism and western historiography, the arguments for 
and benefits of trading one ‘centrism’ for another remains debatable. Nonetheless, historians 
must now recognize the economic weight of Asia and the central place of China within the early 
modern silver trade. In this respect, pace Wallerstein and Braudel, a global market framework 
rejects the idea of European exceptionalism and the argument that the sixteenth-century world 
economy was created and in turn centered on an expanding and economically more developed 
Europe. Rather, it recognizes that at this time Asia, and more specifically China, enjoyed a 
competitive productive edge over Europe and may have constituted the true center of a 
centuries-old global economic system.
While a global market framework recognizes the economic weight of China throughout 
the early modern period, it is not based on a sinocentric model of the early modern global 
economy. As the work of Flynn and Giraldez has demonstrated, the use of such a framework for 
the study of transpacific trade leads to a predominant focus on silver exports from Spanish
18 See Andre Gunder Frank and Barry Gills, eds., The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand? 
(New York: Routledge, 1993). Andre Gunder Frank, ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age (Berkeley 
California: University o f California Press, 1998),
“Asia’s absorption o f  silver, and to a lesser extent gold...in the seventeenth century, was primarily the 
result o f  a relative difference in international production cost and prices. It was not until the large-scale 
application o f machinery in the nineteenth century that Europe was able to bridge the effect o f the price 
differential.” K.N. Chaudhuri, The Trading World of Asia and the East India Company 1660-1760 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1978), 456. See also Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, 
and the Making of a Modem World Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
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America. It also explains this export trade largely as a consequence of the high demand for
bullion in China. As a result, Spanish America’s role in transpacific commerce and global trade in
general, is defined largely by its ability to supply a seemingly limidess amount of silver.
Furthermore, within a sinocentric framework, Spanish America is understood to be a peripheral
region whose economy was affected, to quote Katharine Bjork once more, by “the dynamics of a
20global economy driven by Asian products and practices.” As a result, there is littie emphasis on 
tracing the impact of transpacific trade on historical developments in Spanish America.
Stock demand monetary theory and sinocentric frameworks explain theoretically why 
silver bullion flowed consistentiy to China throughout the early modern period. They do not 
adequately address, however, why Spanish merchants were compelled to ship millions of pesos’ 
worth of silver to Asia. They also fail to take into account how internal Spanish American 
economic and social developments connected but not limited to silver mining, helped to drive 
the expansion of transpacific trade in the late 1500s. Therefore, in contrast to an Asian or 
sinocentric model, a global market framework does not seek to explain the development of 
transpacific trade predominantly in terms of economic expansion in Asia and global silver flows 
to China. Rather, it seeks to understand the Manila Galleon trade network in terms of the 
complementary demand for imported commodities in Spanish American markets and silver in 
China. The focus on this complementary demand allows for a more balanced approach to 
conducting research on early modern transpacific trade. It also focuses attention on the ways in 
which historical developments in Spanish America both impacted and were affected by this 
commerce.
Emphasizing the role of Spanish American markets as both a producers and consumers 
of global commodities can also help to globalize the early history of the Manila Galleon beyond 
silver flows. While Atlantic remittances of New World silver were crucial in bankrolling the
20 Katharine Bjork, “The Link That Kept the Philippines Spanish,” 25-50.
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imperial ambitions of Philip II, Sevillie’s near monopoly over colonial markets was an equally 
important source of revenue. It allowed Sevillean merchants to reap substantial profits from the 
importation of European goods to Spanish America, which in turn allowed them to loan 
impressive sums to the crown. The opening of direct trade with Asia threatened to undermine 
Seville’s control of Spanish American markets and with it, the ability of Philip II to finance his 
imperial ambitions within continental Europe and the Mediterranean basin. By focusing on the 
demand for imports in Spanish America, a global market framework shows that the rapid rise of 
transpacific trade impacted not just bullion flows but also patterns of consumption in Spanish 
America and with them, the financial underpinnings of Spain’s sixteenth-century global empire.
When viewed from the standpoint of a global market framework, the establishment of 
regular transpacific trade in the last third of the sixteenth-century is significant in several 
respects. While it created, for the first time in history, a commercial link between Asia and the 
Americas, it did so at a time when the economies of both regions were undergoing periods of 
expansion. In Asia and the Americas, silver had an integral role to play in this process. The rapid 
expansion of silver mining after 1550 helped fuel a general expansion of colonial economies 
throughout Spanish America. This expansion helped to increase the demand for imported 
supplies of not only consumer goods but also raw materials and slaves for use in the mining and 
agriculture sectors. While in Asia, the demand for silver, principally by Chinese merchants, 
helped bring about an increase in inter-Asian commerce and economic development.
As those who argue in favor o f a sinocentric early modern global economy have 
emphasized, sixteenth-century economic expansion in Asia was driven in part by an increase in 
China’s foreign trade. The main reason for this increase can be traced to the growing demand 
within China for silver bullion. The inability o f the Ming dynasty to successfully develop a stable 
medium of exchange, whether paper currency or bronze coinage, drove Chinese merchants as
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2 1early as the 1430s to seek out silver as a store of value. By the 1500s, silver emerged as the 
preferred medium of exchange for Chinese merchants. Tax policies of the Ming dynasty also 
contributed significantly to the high demand for silver in China. Beginning in 1581, the dynasty 
required that all land taxes be paid in silver. This policy compelled millions of Chinese peasants 
to procure supplies of the metal each year from merchants. To do so, many expanded
22production of silk thread and other marketable goods that could be exchanged for silver. Pardy 
as a result of the Ming dynasty’s ban on domestic silver mining, the increasing demand for silver 
in China could not be met by domestic supplies. As a result, Chinese merchants turned to 
foreign sources and exported increasing quantities of domestically produced goods. This in turn 
stimulated the development of export production, especially in the ceramic and textile producing 
regions of southern China.
The increasing demand for silver in China and the accompanying increase in Ming era 
foreign trade had a tremendous impact on the surrounding economies of Asia. Like China, the 
larger commercial zone of Southeast Asia saw substantial economic development beginning in 
the early fifteenth-century. As Anthony Reid has demonstrated, “the entire period 1400-1630 
was one of rapid monetization and commercialization of the [Southeast Asian] economy.” As a 
result, increasing segments of the region’s population became involved in long-distance trade 
circuits as both producers and consumers of goods.23 The Indian subcontinent and the wider 
regional economy of the Indian Ocean was also witnessing an intensification of commercial
21 See Richard Von Glahn, Fountain of Fortune: Money and Monetary Polity in China 1000-1700.
“As a means o f  earning the necessary amount to pay taxes, farmers began to engage in the production of  
cash crops or handicraft goods...In terms o f  the time and labor spent...silk offered a much higher return 
than field crops. Furthermore, the low capital, high-labor type o f investment involved in household 
sericulture made it easy for the ordinary farming family to engage in such work.” Shih Min-Hsiung. The 
Silk Industry in C h’ing China (Ann Arbor, MI: Center For Chinese Studies University o f Michigan, 1976), 4- 
5.
23 “The pattern o f  exchange in this age o f commerce was for Southeast Asia to import cloth from India, 
silver from the Americas and Japan and copper-cash, silk, ceramics, and other manufactures from Chine, 
in exchange for its exports o f pepper, spices, aromatic woods, resins, lacquer, tortoise shell, pearls, 
deerskins, and the sugar exported by Vietnam and Cambodia.” Anthony Reid, ‘southeast Asia in the Age of 
Commerce 1450-1680, Vol. 2 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 129.
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activity, expansion of long-distance trade, and an increasing focus on production for the export 
market during this period.24 These developments helped to meet and were partly driven by the 
growing demand for silver in China and the subsequent increase in the velocity and supply of 
silver along global trade routes.25
The high demand for silver in China has led historians to regard the country as a 
“seemingly bottomless silver sink” during the early modern period.26 The main sources of the 
silver flowing into the Chinese sink throughout the sixteenth-century were Japan and the 
colonies of New Spain and Pern. While almost the entirety of Japanese production found its way 
directly to China, American silver, before the opening of the Manila Galleon trade route, 
followed a more indirect path. With the discovery of the vast silver deposits of Peru, namely the 
mountain of Potosi, along with the significant reserves of New Spain in the mid 1500s, 
tremendous amounts of silver began to flow across the Atlantic and into Europe.27 Until the 
1580s when transpacific trade began to take off, the majority of New World production ended 
up in Europe. Once in the hands of European merchants, an estimated thirty to forty percent of 
this total was shipped annually to Asia in exchange for spices, textiles, ceramics, and other 
wares.28 Spain’s conquest and the subsequent development of New World resources thus helped 
to feed the demand for silver in China and the demand for Asian imports in Europe.
24 K.N. Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 
209.
25”The increase o f [Southeast Asian] production for the world market would not have been possible 
without a great increase in the money supply.” Anthony Reid, ‘southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450- 
1680, Vol. 2, 93. “India had a massive balance o f trade surplus with Europe and some with West Asia [as a 
result] India received massive amounts o f silver and some gold from the West...Since India produced little 
silver o f its own, it used the imported silver mostly for coinage or re-export...India seems to have had a 
balance o f trade deficit with Southeast Asia, or at least India re-exported silver there, especially to China.” 
Gunder Frank, ReOrient, 87-88.
26 Dennis Flynn and Artuto Giraldez, “Born with a Silver Spoon,” 206.
27 An estimated 150,000 tons o f silver was mined in Latin America between 1500 and 1800. This figure, 
which has been called conservative, constitutes over 80 percent o f  world production for the period in 
question. The majority o f this total was exported to Europe. Dennis Flynn and Artuto Giraldez, “Born 
with a Silver Spoon,” 202.
28 Gunder Frank, R^Orient, 143-144.
20
While the increase in global silver flows helped to drive economic expansion in Asia and
the early modern trading world in general, the development of silver mining in New Spain and
Peru caused commercial developments in the Spanish colonies of the New World to trend
upwards throughout the second half of the sixteenth-century. Silver output was already
substantial in the 1560s, amounting to over fifty million pesos a year, but production was set to
increase dramatically following the introduction of the mercury amalgamation process in Potosi
in the early 1570s. By the opening of the seventeenth-century, silver production would amount
to 120 million pesos annually before entering a temporary phase of decline in the first half of the
seventeenth-century. The rapid expansion of the mining industry helped to further the
development of colonial economies, placing demands on local agriculture and artisan trades to
29supply the growing size and number of mining centers.
As mining grew, so did Spanish American cities. Along with widespread economic
development, the process of urbanization in the New World was also increasing during the
second half of the sixteenth-century. In New Spain alone, the number of vednos, or city-dwelling
male heads of households, rose from 11,000 to 36,000 between 1580 and 1630. As Louisa Schell
Hoberman puts it, urbanization, coupled with commercial expansion, resulted in the emergence
of “a more sophisticated consuming public [that demanded] hitherto unknown or unavailable
30products, provided by merchants.” While consumers demanded larger supplies of goods, the 
mining and agricultural industries also required increasing quantities of raw iron, metal tools, and 
mercury. The demand for manufactures, luxury wares, and supplies of iron and mercury in the 
already undersupplied markets of the Americas was therefore increasing at the same moment 
that direct trade with Asia became possible.
The increasing demand for foreign imports, be they supplies of iron and mercury or
29 Stanley J Stein and Barbara Stein, Essays on Economic Dependence in Perspective, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1970), 29.
q n
Louisa Hoberman, Mexico's Merchant Elite, 1590 - 1660 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991), 7.
21
textiles and household wares, is most evident in the booming mining centers of the late 1500s.
At this time, Potosi, Zacatecas and other smaller mining centers were highly commercial and
monetized urban economies that were dependent on regional and long- distance trade for a
majority of their material needs. While the buying power of social, political, and economic elites
in such urban mining centers was substantial, they do not represent the only consumers in such
markets. As Jane Mangan has shown for sixteenth-century Potosi, the increase in the number of
indigenous workers receiving cash wages for mine labor and the wide circulation of unminted
31silver allowed laborers to become regular consumers of imported goods as well. Supplying the 
needs of Potosfs consumers was not restricted to Spanish merchants who possessed ties to 
regional or overseas trade centers. By the late 1500s, indigenous, free black, and Creole women 
had emerged as prominent urban merchants who purchased supplies of goods outside of Potosi
32only to resell them at a considerable profit in the city. While further research is needed, the 
inner dynamics of most Spanish American urban economies centered on silver and gold mining 
likely resembled that of Potosi.
Other urban markets such as Lima, Quito, Puebla, and Mexico City were also, to varying 
degrees, dependent on imported manufactures, although few could match the notorious levels of 
conspicuous consumption found in mining towns. Nevertheless, there were substantial 
commercial profits to be had for those with the means and abilities import and distribute 
material goods to these growing and sometimes remote urban centers. Sixteenth-century Quito 
represented one such urban economy that was relatively isolated within the Andean highlands of 
South America yet found its markets regularly stocked with European and by the late 1500s, 
Asian imports. As Kris Lane discovered in his study of sixteenth-century Quito, “merchants 
large and small and of European, indigenous, or mixed heritage had.. .transformed [Quito] into a
31 Jane Mangan, Trading Roles: Gender; Ethnicity, and the Urban Economy in Colonial Roto si (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2005), 43, 35, 52.
32 Jane Mangan, Trading Roles: Gender; Ethnicity, and the Urban Economy in Colonial Potosi, 43, 35, 52.
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consumer’s paradise” by the 1590s and catered to “discriminating consumers of various 
ethnicities.”33
While colonial demand for imports was undoubtedly substantial, gauging the size and
consuming capacity of New World markets is difficult. Most estimates place Spanish America’s
European population circa 1600 at 200,000, with these individuals being the most likely
consumers of imported goods. Textiles, porcelain, jewelry, furniture, foodstuffs and other goods
would have been heavily desired by colonists of European ancestry as indicators of social status.
Anyone aspiring to higher social standing would have also utilized Asian imports as a means of
distancing themselves from the lower classes. Not all such aspirants were Europeans. An
estimated five to ten percent of the Indian population, the Native American elite, were also
regular consumers.34 In New Spain and Peru, the total Indian population circa 1570 is estimated
to have been around three million. By the first decades of the 1600s, this number had fallen to
approximately two million, a development that undoubtedly reduced the number and purchasing
35power of the Indian elite. Nonetheless, they would have remained avid consumers of imported 
goods. Observations by merchants and colonial officials in the late 1500s also indicate that some 
imports, especially textiles, were consumed regularly by European, Creole and indigenous 
laborers. Ultimately, however, a more complete understanding of sixteenth-century colonial 
markets and patterns of consumption awaits further archival research.
The establishment of the Manila Galleon trade network in the 1570s thus provided a 
link between the complementary demand for silver in China and imported commodities in 
Spanish America. As a result, the value of transpacific trade expanded rapidly over the last third
33 Kris Lane, Quito 1599: City and Colony in Transition (Albuquerque, NM: University o f New Mexico Press, 
2002), 57, 174.
34 “Almost from the first, [Indian elites] consciously sought to widen the gape between themselves and the 
Indian mass by adopting Spanish culture.. .and seeking to conform to the Spanish image o f a gendemen 
and hidalgo.” J. I. Israel, Race, Class, and Politics in Colonial Mexico (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 
44.
35 Peter Bakewell, A. Histoty of Eatin America, 2nd Edition (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 1997), 160-163.
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of the sixteenth-century. Exact figures are lacking, but by the end of the sixteenth- century, 
somewhere between 700,000 to two million pesos’ worth of New World silver flowed annually 
through Manila on its way to Asian markets. Spanish America’s trade with Asia was, therefore, 
comparable if not equal to Europe’s commerce with the East by the late 1500s.
In terms of silver flows, the Manila Galleon was far from a commercial sideshow of the 
early modern global economy. Undoubtedly, the high price of silver in China, as much as twice 
the going rate in Europe, played an important role in the growth of transpacific trade throughout 
the last decades of the sixteenth-century. It was, however, not the only factor. Economic 
expansion throughout Spanish America was also at this time increasing the demand and 
consuming capacity of colonial markets for imported textiles, household goods, spices, and other 
commodities that could not be produced within the Americas. While colonial consumers had 
access to European imports via Spanish transatlantic trade, Sevillean merchants actively sought 
to limit the supply of such goods in colonial markets in order to increase profit margins. The 
opening of transpacific trade thus helped to meet the increasing and chronically unmet demand 
for imports by colonial consumers throughout Spanish America. Therefore, it was the 
complementary demand for silver in China and imported commodities in Spanish America that 
drove the rapid development of the Manila Galleon trade network in late sixteenth century.
The Structure o f Sixteenth Century Spanish Atlantic Trade
In order to understand fully how the demand for Asian imports by colonial consumers 
in Spanish America helped to drive the expansion of transpacific commerce it is necessary to 
understand the structure of sixteenth century Spanish Atlantic trade. Columbus’ maiden voyage 
in 1492 and Spain’s conquest of large sections of Central and South America in the proceeding 
decades, connected these regions with global trade routes linking Europe, Africa, and Asia.
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Having established control over millions of indigenous peoples and their imperial states, the
Crown was highly protective of its newly won empire in the Americas. As a result, an
increasingly elaborate imperial structure was developed throughout the sixteenth- century to
prevent rival European merchants from gaining access to colonial markets and the increasing
quantities of precious metals being mined throughout the Americas. While it is tempting to label
such an approach as mercantilist, Spanish officials did not possess or draw from a predesigned
commercial playbook in the sixteenth century. Rather than instituting a set of clearly defined and
articulated trade regulations, Spanish imperial policy towards its American colonies was a
reaction to economic and political developments taking place on the ground. As Clarence Haring
argued in a pioneering study, it was haphazard at best, driven by “blind opportunism” on the
36part of the Crown and the Spanish merchant community.
The “blind opportunism” of the Crown towards its colonial territories was shaped and 
in part driven by several political and social factors. Unlike most territories falling within the 
Spanish Crown’s sphere of imperial control in the sixteenth-century, the colonies of the New 
World were considered to be the personal possessions of the monarch. In comparison, Iberian 
kingdoms such as Aragon and cities such as Barcelona retained a considerable degree of control 
over their internal governance despite pledging allegiance to the Spanish king. This political 
situation greatly restrained the authority of the Crown on the Peninsula, making it difficult to 
raise taxes or force economic concessions. As a result, the financial burden of empire fell largely 
on the shoulders of Castilians and the silver-rich colonies of the New World throughout the 
second half o f the sixteenth century. Together with the prevailing commercial and economic 
milieu of early modern Spain which stressed the acquisition of steady, reliable income streams 
over commercial risk taking, the Crown’s direct control of its New World colonies led it to adopt 
a commercially conservative, rent-seeking approach to colonial trade.
36 C.H. Haring, Trade and Navigation, 129.
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The overwhelming importance placed on securing a steady and reliable stream of 
income from the New World is clearly demonstrated by the Crown’s stance on colonial 
development and the establishment of the Sevillean Consulado in 1543. On the one hand, the 
development of colonial economies was closely controlled, an approach that Haring described as 
being “excessively paternalistic.”37 This paternalistic attitude entailed an active encouragement of 
colonial economic development so long as it did not conflict with existing industries in Spain. 
Silver mining, for example, along with sugar, cacao, and cochineal production, were all New 
World industries that received the blessing of the Crown. Peruvian olive oil and wine production, 
on the other hand, faced prohibition due to the fear of competition with Spanish imports. That 
its colonies should develop and prosper was never questioned by the Crown; they should do so, 
however, in complement to the (favored) Spanish economy.
By the last third of the sixteenth-century, the New World mining industry emerged as a 
proverbial cash cow for both the king and the Consulado. Like the colonies themselves, 
American silver reserves fell under the personal control of Philip II. Rather than exploit them 
through government-run mines, the Crown allowed private Spanish colonists to incur the 
commercial risks and substantial start-up costs that mining entailed. All extracted silver was, 
however, subject to royal taxes levied at both New World mints or smeltery houses and Atlantic 
ports. The main royal tax, known as the quinto real, was set at a fifth of total production, but in 
many places this rate was lowered to a tenth or less in order to stimulate the expansion of 
mining. Increasing the volume of American silver and gold production remained a prime 
objective for the Crown throughout the early modem period. Doing so increased royal tax 
revenue and annual remittances to Spain. It also helped to expand colonial consumption of 
European imports delivered by the Consulado.
37 C.H. Haring, Trade and Navigation, 123.
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Along with the quinto real, the almojarifavgo was another major source of crown revenue
from the Indies. The almojarifaqgo constituted a customs duty collected at both Seville and
Atlantic ports in the Americas. In Spain, a five percent duty was levied on both imports and
exports while in the Indies, imported goods were taxed at ten percent and exports two and a 
38half. That New World exports were taxed at a much lower rate indicates that the Crown was 
sincere in fostering the development of colonial economies. Again, however, Charles V and 
Philip II were highly selective in terms of what colonial industries to encourage and what sectors 
of the sixteenth-century colonial economy to support with royal financing and the granting of 
commercial privileges.
This active management of colonial economic development was driven in part by the 
need to safeguard the commercial interests of the Consulado. Composed of powerful Sevillean 
merchants who lent money to the Crown, the Consulado was granted the authority to manage all 
commerce between Spain and its colonial dependencies in the New World. This trade monopoly 
allowed Sevillean merchants to control the supply of certain goods circulating within the colonial 
economy. In return for this privilege, they regularly loaned impressive sums of money to the 
Crown. In practice, the commercial policies of the Consulado actively sought to limit the volume 
of European imports irTthe Americas, thereby driving up the price of these goods. As Clarence 
Haring put it, these monopolistic practices resulted in colonial markets being “kept chronically 
understocked [with the Consulado constituting] a perpetual coalition for the exploitation of the 
[colonial] public, and in restraint o f trade.”39 In effect, Sevillean merchants sought to maintain 
artificial market conditions throughout the Indies in order to insure high profit margins from 
transatlantic trade. In 1567 Fray Tomas Mercado noted that as a result, “a vara [about 33 bolt
38 Lyle N. McAlister, Spain and Portugal in the New World, 1492-1700 (Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1984), 243.
39 C.H. Haring, Trade and Navigation, 137.
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inches] of velvet worth 1,000 maravedis in Seville would cost 2,000 maravedis in the Indies.”40 
While highly advantageous to the profits of the Sevillean merchant community and royal tax 
receipts from the almojarifa^go, this practice also helped to ensure high remittances of private 
silver to Spain. As a consequence of the Consulado’s price fixing, however, colonial merchant 
and consumer demand for imported goods was left largely unfulfilled.
The Crown’s rent-seeking approach towards its New World colonies had a profound 
impact on the structure of Atlantic trade. At first, commerce with the Americas stimulated the 
Spanish economy. Colonial demand for foodstuffs led to an expansion of Iberian agriculture and 
the need for iron tools, steel weapons, leather goods and textiles drove the expansion of urban 
production. By the mid 1500s, however, colonial development and political consolidation had 
produced an increase in agriculture and animal husbandry in the Americas. The demand for 
Spanish foodstuffs fell off while the need for manufactures and luxury goods increased beyond 
the productive capacity of Spanish artisans. Unable to procure the necessary goods from Spain 
alone, the merchants of Seville began to turn increasingly to the wider economy of Europe to 
acquire the wares needed to load ships bound for the New World.41 Thus, despite their near 
monopoly of transatlantic trade, the Sevillean Consulado was, by the late 1500s, evolving into a 
commercial middleman, facilitating commerce between the larger economy of Europe and the 
specie-rich markets of the Americas.42
While the Consulado’s monopoly over colonial markets was never perfect, Seville was 
able to dominate sixteenth and early seventeenth-century trade with Spanish America in all but 
one commodity; African slaves. The inability of Spain to successfully challenge Portuguese 
control of the African slave trade in the sixteenth-century forced the Crown of Castile to revert
40 Quoted in Lyle N. McAlister, Spain and Portugal in the New World, 245.
41 J.H. Parry, The Spanish Seaborne Empire (New York: Knopf, 1966), 114. John Fisher, The Economic Aspects 
ojSpanish Imperialism, 1492-1810 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1997), 37-42.
Stanley J Stein and Barbara Stein, The Colonial Heritage of Eatin America: Essays on Economic Dependence in 
Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970). O.H.K. Spate, The Spanish Take, 206.
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to issuing licenses to Portuguese traders. These licenses granted their owner permission to 
import merchandise to Spanish America. In exchange for this privilege, individual traders were 
required to deliver African slaves to designated colonial markets. Official licenses were not 
valued primarily for the right to trade in slaves, however, as substantially larger profits could be 
realized by importing European wares to colonial markets.
For the period being examined here, 1571-1604, Portuguese importation of African 
slaves and other commodities to Spanish America remained limited. In the early 1500s, the total 
volume of the Spanish Atlantic slave trade was relatively small, amounting to some 500 
individuals a year between 1521 and 1550. After mid-century, the total rose modesdy to an 
average of 800 slaves for the period 1551 to 1595. By the opening of the seventeenth-century the 
inflow of slaves to Spanish America had increased dramatically and averaged over 2800 annually 
from 1600 to 1645.43 The steady growth of the trade during this period was due in part to an 
increase on the supply side by both Portuguese and African merchants. Demand in Spanish 
America, however, also played a key role. Colonial economic expansion led by the mining and 
agricultural sectors demanded an increasing number of laborers. While indigenous workers 
provided the majority of labor, their numbers steady declined throughout the 1500s. By the first 
decades of the seventeenth-century, indigenous population levels hit a low point in both New 
Spain and Peru before stabilizing and recovering slowly after 1650. As the substantial growth in 
slave imports after 1595 indicates, the decline of the indigenous work force caused an increasing 
turn to imported slave labor throughout the Americas. This in turn allowed Portuguese traders to 
expand their importation of other commodities and challenge the Consulado’s dominance of 
colonial markets.
43 Philip D. Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade: A  Consensus (Madison, Wisconsin: The University o f Wisconsin 
Press, 1969), 25.
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Together, the Crown’s stance on colonial industries and the Consulado’s trade policies 
stressed the preservation of large, annual silver remittances to Spain and high, immediate profits 
for Sevillean merchants. Although significant, silver remittances from the Americas never 
constituted a majority of Crown revenue. On average, they amounted to some twenty percent of 
royal income each year. The ability to pay interest on existing loans and receive new infusions of 
cash from both Sevillean and European bankers, however, depended heavily on the annual 
arrival of Atlantic treasure fleets.
From the beginning of his reign, Philip II was dependent on deficit financing to cover 
the ever-increasing military expenditures required to defend his scattered imperial domains. To 
maintain both naval and land defenses, the Crown resorted to the asiento and the juro de resguardo. 
The asiento constituted a short-term loan that was backed by a specified revenue stream such as 
the quinto real. The Crown negotiated individual asientos with various European bankers and 
powerful merchant houses in Seville and pledged to repay each in full on a specified date. 
Generally, these loans accumulated interest at an annual rate of ten to fourteen percent. When 
the Crown failed to repay a mature asiento, the holder was guaranteed an additional ten percent of 
the loan's value. The juro de resguardo on the other hand, was a long-term bond with an interest 
rate of between five and ten percent.44
By the last third of the sixteenth-century, Philip II’s mounting military expenditures in
•#
Europe necessitated the pledge of his entire share of New World silver as collateral to European 
bankers. As a result, the merchants of Seville and, beginning in the 1550s, Genoese bankers were 
in reality the principle recipients of the Spanish Crown’s share of American treasure. The heavy 
reliance on the asiento to cover imperial expenses, however, forced Philip II to declare medios 
generates in 1557, 1575, and 1596. Each was essentially a declaration of bankruptcy and “involved
44 Lyle N. McAlister, Spain and Portugal in the New World, 297-298.
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a repudiation of outstanding asientos and compensation of holders with jurors at lower interest
j_ >?45rates.
Together, Philip IPs reliance on monetary loans backed by New World revenue streams 
and the Consulado’s increasing dependence on European imports meant that preserving Seville’s 
control over colonial markets was vital to insuring the financial well being of the Spanish 
monarchy. This trade monopoly not only provided high commercial profits for the Consulado's 
members, it allowed them to loan impressive sums of money to the king and guaranteed a steady 
stream of silver remittances from the New World. For the Crown, a decrease in either the flow 
of silver to Spain or the commercial profits of Sevillean merchantswould have reduced its ability 
to service existing debt or contract for further loans. In short, a failure to safeguard the 
Consulado’s monopoly would have forced the Crown to confront the potential of financial 
insolvency and with it the collapse of its imperial designs throughout continental Europe.
The Structure o f Early Colonial Trade
‘I t  seems to me that one o f the good and most important businesses in this land [the N ew  World] is merchandise, 
fo r  in that are the true mines, beyond what one can believe. .. The profit is so sure and so large that a well stocked 
shop here is the richest thing in the world, alchemy itse lf”—Juan Pelaez de Berrio, alcalde mayor of Oaxaca, 
1529 46
By the mid sixteenth-century, the Consulado and Casa de la Contratacion (House of 
Trade) had together created a sophisticated commercial network and flotilla system designed to 
transport goods across the Atlantic and ferry safely back to Spain the majority of the New
45 Lyle N. McAlister, Spain and Portugal in the New World, 298.
46 Quoted in Peter Bakewell, A  History of Latin America to 1825, Third Edition, 253-254.
31
World’s gold and silver bullion production. However, this transatlantic trade network terminated 
at only a handful of ports along the coastline of the Americas. Once imported merchandise from 
Seville arrived in the New World it had to be transported to regional markets located throughout 
the interior and along the Pacific coastline of the Americas. As a result, a small but significant 
overland and Pacific commercial network developed in tandem with Atlantic trade to circulate 
European imports, locally produced goods, and precious metals between the regional markets of 
New Spain, Panama, and Peru.
While there existed several Atlantic ports in the mid 1500s where Spanish galleons 
frequently unloaded European imports, the majority of traffic was funneled through Veracruz 
and Nombre de Dios. Veracruz constituted the principal port of New Spain and was connected 
directly to Mexico City, Puebla, and other urban centers of central Mexico. Supplying the colony 
of Peru however, proved to be a far more difficult endeavor. Nombre de Dios, replaced in 1597 
by Portobelo, was the main commercial port along the Isthmus of Panama’s Atlantic coast. Here, 
goods were unloaded and transported across the Isthmus to Panama City by a combination of 
oar driven boats, Indian laborers, African slaves, and draft animals. Although the distance was 
relatively short, it was a long and difficult journey involving sixty miles of movement along the 
coastline, weeks’ worth of travel against the current of the Rio de Chagres, and a fifteen-mile 
hike through dense tropical forests. The Florentine merchant Francesco Carletti described his 
experience of the crossing in 1594 as being “so bad that nothing worse can ever be imagined.”47 
After reaching Panama City, goods destined for Peru were loaded onto ships for another long 
and difficult journey southward. By the time Europeans imports actually reached El Callao, the 
principal port of not only Lima but the entire Pacific coast of South America, their prices in
47 Francesco Carletti, My Voyage Around the World, trans. Herbert Weinstock (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1964), 29.
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comparison to those of New Spain had increased substantially due primarily to the difficulties 
involved in shipping 48
The immense difficulty of supplying Peruvian markets from Seville led, beginning in the 
1530s, to direct trade between the southern viceroyalty and New Spain. At first, commerce 
between the two colonies amounted to a handful of shipments a year with cargoes originating 
from Mexico consisting of locally produced foodstuffs and imported merchandise from Spain. 
However, following the establishment of civil order in Peru and the discovery of Potosfs 
enormous silver deposits in 1545, the market for textiles and other merchandise began to 
expand. Despite the newfound wealth of the colony, local production remained inadequate to 
meet this growing demand for manufactures. New Spain, with its direct connection to Seville and 
its small but growing domestic textile and artisan production thus found itself by the mid 1500s 
ideally positioned to supply Peruvian markets.
By 1560, the exchange of Peruvian silver for Mexican and Spanish imports had become 
the basis of a commercial relationship that would remain largely unchanged for the next century. 
Merchandise exported southward from New Spain included Spanish and Mexican textiles, silk 
thread, blankets, leather goods, dyes, furniture, dishes, cups, various toiletry items, metal tools, 
jewelry, devotional objects, books, and a host of other wares.49 The majority of these goods were 
exchanged for silver, although, small amounts of agricultural goods such as olive oil and wine 
were also shipped northward. Commercial traffic between the two viceroyalties remained limited, 
however, amounting to perhaps 120,000 to 200,000 pesos a year by the 1560s.50 Although details 
for this period remain scarce and further research on inter-Pacific colonial commerce is required, 
a small but growing Pacific commercial network was in place prior to the opening of regular 
trade between the Americas and Asia in 1571.
48 Woodrow Borah, Early Co Ionia I Trade, 81-82.
49 Woodrow Borah, Early Colonial Trade, 86-87.
50 Woodrow Borah, Early Colonial Trade, 94,
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The Birth o f  Transpacific Trade
“Apart from this spur to expansion, there were of course the lure of riches just over the horizon, the lure of fame, 
the continuing lure of a way to the Orient. O.H.K. Spate
As outlined above, Spanish colonization of the New World and the subsequent 
development of transadantic and inter-colonial commerce helped to enhance the financial well­
being of the Spanish king and deliver substantial commercial profits to the Consulado. The rent- 
seeking approach towards colonial trade and development also ensured that once discovered, the 
immense silver reserves of the New World were quickly exploited and the overwhelming 
majority of production funneled directly to Europe. While clearly beneficial to the short-term 
finances of both the Crown and Spanish merchants, the rapid growth of the New World mining 
industry allowed European merchants, namely the Portuguese, to expand trade with Asia and 
insert themselves into lucrative inter-Asian trade circuits.51 In doing so, the velocity and volume 
of silver circulating along global trade routes increased, furthering commercial expansion in Asia 
and helping to feed the region’s demand for silver. The predominant eastward flow of silver 
from the Americas to Europe and then Asia would soon be challenged, however, as Spanish 
explorers and colonizers covetously eyed the success of their Portuguese rivals in East Asia.
Despite the distraction that the conquest and establishment of New World colonies 
posed to the Crown during the first half of the sixteenth-century, the desire to reach Asia by 
sailing west remained. Although Magellan had discovered the Philippines in 1521, the first 
attempt to establish a permanent Spanish settlement in the archipelago had failed. Nonetheless,
51 See James C. Boyajian, Portuguese Trade in Asia under the Habsburgs, 1580-1640 (Baltimore, MA: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1993).
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Philip II remained committed to extending Spain’s empire across the Pacific, spreading the 
Catholic faith, and pursuing direct access to Asian markets. In 1564 the King ordered Miguel 
Lopez de Legaspi to set sail from New Spain bound for the Philippines. On reaching his 
destination he was to make a reconnaissance of the islands and establish there a permanent 
Spanish settlement. On the return journey, the king instructed him “to bring [back] some spice, 
in order to make an essay of that traffic [and] as much treasure as possible.” 52 Reaching the 
Philippines in April of 1565, Legaspi established a settlement on the island of Cebu and from 
there continued to survey the archipelago. Two months later he dispatched a ship to New Spain 
with a letter informing Philip II that the newly founded Spanish outpost stood “at the gate and in 
the vicinity of the most fortunate countries of the world.”53
As of June 1565, no European vessels had crossed the Pacific from the Americas to Asia 
and back again. The ship dispatched by Legaspi was therefore tasked with not only relaying the 
news of Spain’s newly acquired colony but also discovering an eastward passage from Asia to the 
Americas. Guided by Andres de Urdaneta, the San Pedro left the Philippines in a northeasterly 
direction and traveled as far north as Japan before heading east at a latitude of 38 degrees north. 
Urdaneta believed that by sailing north from the Philippines he could pick up the northern trade 
winds of the Pacific and use them to ferry the San Pedro back to the Americas. Although 
Urdaneta’s hunch proved to be correct, the eastward crossing of the Northern Pacific was 
anything but a straight shot and for over a month and a half the San Pedro ranged between 40 
and 30 degrees north before spotting North America in mid- September. From Cape 
Mendocino, the vessel followed the North American coastline down to Acapulco, arriving on the 
8th of October after a voyage of 130 days and over 12,000 miles.
52 William Schurz, The Manila Galleon, 22.
53 Emma Blair and James Robertson, The Philippine Islands 1493 - 1898, Volume II, 226, 214.
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The San Pedro's easterly course across the Pacific quickly became known as TJrdaneta’s 
Route’ but it was by no means an easy voyage. Pacific trade winds proved difficult to master; 
timing was of the essence, and most trips took an average of six to eight months. Supplies of 
food and water often ran dangerously low. Despite the inherent dangers of TJrdaneta’s Route’, it 
quickly became the standard course for Manila Galleons making their return trip to the 
Americas. Sailing from New Spain to Asia was in contrast a much easier and quicker endeavor 
with voyages lasting an average of two months. Ships leaving Acapulco sailed to the southwest 
and after reaching 10 degrees north, where the west trade winds could be picked up, made a 
more or less straight shot across the Pacific to the Philippines.
While the successful colonization of the Philippines and eastward crossing of the Pacific
laid the foundation for trade between Asia and the Americas, the late 1560s saw little in the way
of profitable, much less substantial, transpacific commerce. At first it was thought that the
islands could be transformed into a major producer of cinnamon, but Legaspi abandoned this
idea by 1568. He reported to Philip II that he doubted the settlement could “be sustained by way
of [that] trade” and a year later remarked, “the Philippines ought to be considered of litde
importance.”54 Juan Pablo Carrion, Legaspi’s admiral, also doubted that the colony would prove
55profitable unless trade was “opened with China and the rest of the Indies.” At the time, the 
Philippines could scarcely be considered a major center of trade in Southeast Asian nor were the 
islands overtly rich in spices or other exportable commodities. Native Filipinos, however, had a 
long history of regular trade with Chinese and other Asian merchants. Prior to the arrival of the 
Spanish, Chinese ceramics, Thai porcelain, decorative beads, and copper gongs and pots among 
other items had been imported to the Philippines in exchange for cotton, gold, wax, honey, and 
other foodstuffs for centuries. Thus, with the establishment of a permanent settlement in the
54 Blair and Robertson, Vol. II, “Letters to Felipe II of Spain,” 241. William Schurz, The Manila Galleon, 23.
55 William Schurz, The Manila Galleon, 45.
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Philippines, the Spanish successfully inserted themselves into Southeast Asian trade circuits that, 
while already undergoing economic expansion, were about to enter a much more rapid period of 
development.56
Despite the fact that Legaspi was quick to dismiss the value of Spain’s newest colonial 
settlement, such a view hardly seems to have been shared by colonial merchants in Spanish 
America who made their livelihood dealing in overseas imports. In a letter forwarded from 
Seville to Miguel Salvador of Valencia and published as a pamphlet in 1566, an unknown author 
related the news of Legaspi’s expedition and Urdaneta’s return. In reference to the colonization 
of the Philippines and the successful eastward crossing of the Pacific he states, “this is a great 
and very important achievement; and the people of Mexico are very proud of their discovery, 
which they think will make them the center of the world.”57 It is doubtful that individuals in 
Spain took seriously the idea that Mexico could become the “center of the world”. The fact that 
some individuals in the Americas perceived such a development as possible, however, suggests 
merchants, at least, saw something momentous in the opening of transpacific trade. It was true 
that Urdaneta had returned to Acapulco with only meager amounts of spices, gold, wax and 
other articles, which together hardly made for an impressive cargo. Yet the contents of the San 
Pedro mattered litde in comparison to the voyage itself. Urdaneta had not simply left the 
Americas and sailed to Asia and back, he had expanded the limits of what was possible in the 
minds of the colonial merchant community. The chronically under-supplied and increasingly 
silver-rich markets of the Americas were now directly linked to “the most fortunate countries of 
the world”.
56 ”The entire period 1400-1630 was one o f  rapid monetization and commercialization o f the economy, 
with the most rapid expansion in the period 1570-1630.” Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 
Vol. 2, 129.
57 Blair and Robertson, Vol. II, “Copy o f a Letter Sent from Sevilla To Miguel Salvador o f Valencia,” 226.
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Early Com m ercial Expansion: 1571 — 1586
During the first half-decade of Spanish presence in the Philippines, Legaspi and his 
fellow coloni2ers were under constant threat of attack from the Portuguese, who sought to 
prevent them from gaining a foothold in Asian commerce. Defense therefore remained the 
priority, but assessing the possibilities for trade with neighboring Asian states, principally China, 
was also a goal during the first years of settlement. In a 1565 letter to the Audiencia of Mexico, 
officials in the Philippines asked that large quantities of foodstuffs and military supplies be sent 
immediately. Along with theses goods, a substantial number of articles for use in trade, including
58“coins and small bars of fine silver for trade with China” were also requested Spanish
knowledge of Asian commerce remained limited at this time. By 1569, however, it was known
that the Portuguese “were trading and bargaining on the coast of China and Japan; and that it
was a business by which they were maintaining themselves, since it was the most extensive and
59advantageous trade that has been hitherto seen in any place where trade has been carried on.” 
The ability of the Spanish to exploit such an advantageous trade for their own benefit would not 
begin until the conquest of Luzon and the establishment of Manila as the new seat of 
government in 1571. From Manila Bay, the Spanish were able to more easily defend and 
consolidate their control over the Philippines, protect against Portuguese attack, and develop a 
closer commercial relationship with Chinese merchants.
Once the Spanish presence in Manila was secure, regular trade with the Chinese quickly 
developed. By 1573, one Guido de Lavezaris reported to Philip II, “the Chinese have come here 
[to Manila] on trading expeditions, since our arrival [and]...in greater numbers each year, and with 
more ships.” Although an increasing number of Chinese merchants were sailing to Manila, they
58 Blair and Robertson, Vol. II, “Letter from the royal officials o f  the Filipinas to the Royal Audiencia at 
Mexico,” 183-195.
59 Blair and Robertson, Vol. II, 'Letter from Andres de Mirandola to Felipe II,” 20.
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had yet to bring the finer merchandise that they had to offer, indicating to Lavezaris “that, if 
there were any one to buy them, they would bring all we wanted.” Quickly finding the Spanish to 
be eager consumers, these traders began to diversify their cargo, bringing “each year better and 
richer wares.”60 According to the government notary Hernando Requel, the Chinese “brought 
specimens of many kinds of goods peculiar to their country, in order to arrange prices at which 
they can be sold — such as quicksilver, [gun] powder, pepper, fine cinnamon, cloves, sugar, iron, 
copper, tin, brass, silks [and] textiles of many kinds.. .various kinds of crockery...and a thousand 
of other goods and trifles quite as many as the Flemings bring.”61 It did not take long for 
substantial quantities of such goods to arrive in the Americas. In December of 1573, the viceroy 
of New Spain welcomed a ship from Manila containing “one hundred and thirty-six marcos of 
gold.. .jewels.. .two hundred and eighty quintals of cinnamon [acquired from the island of 
Mindanao].. .silks of different colors (both damasks and satins), clothstuffs, and a lot of cotton 
mantles.. .a quantity of wax, glazed earthenware; and other knick-knacks such as fans, parasols, 
desks, and numberless other little manufactured articles.” 62 Included in this shipment were
22,000 pieces of Chinese porcelain.63
In the words of Pierre Chaunu, “the extraordinary luck of the Spanish Philippines was to 
be at the point of contact between two monetary systems, a world of dear silver and a world of 
cheap silver.”64 By the mid 1570s, the basic structure of transpacific trade was in place. Manila 
was the main commercial center of the Philippines and the principal link between the economies 
of Asia and the Americas. Over a dozen junks sailed annually from Fuijian province in southern 
China to Manila, leading to an increase in the size of the Chinese community residing in the
50 Blair and Robertson, Vol. Ill, “Affairs in the Philippines After the Death o f Legazpi,” 160.
61 Blair and Robertson, Vol. Ill, “News from the Western Islands by Hernando Riquel and Others,” 219.
62 Blair and Robertson, Vol. Ill, “Letter from the Viceroy o f New Spain to Felipe II,”192.
63 Luke Clossey, “Merchants, Migrants, Missionaries, and Globalization in the Early-Modern Pacific,” 
Journal of Global History 1 (2006): 42.
64 Pierre Chaunu, Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Iberiques, 458, quoted in O.H.K. Spate, The Pacific Since 
Magellan, 161.
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Spanish colonial capital. As a result, the markets of Manila were reportedly well stocked, with 
buyers able to find “everything in the same abundance as in Espana,” Not only was the variety of 
goods available in the Philippines equal to that of Europe but, because of the high value of silver 
in China, “the prices of everything [the Chinese bring is] so moderate, that they are to be had 
almost for nothing.”65 While the exact quantity and type of goods imported from Asia to the 
New World throughout the late sixteenth century is unknown, Antonio de Morga provided a 
substantial list o f wares available for purchase in Spanish Manila in his 1609 History of the 
Philippine Islands,66
The merchandise that they [the Chinese] generally bring and sell to the 
Spaniards consists of raw silk in bundles, of the fineness of two strands [dos 
mbefas], and other silk of poorer quality; fine untwisted silk, white and of all 
colors, wound in small skeins; quantities of velvets, some plain, and some 
embroidered in all sorts of figures, colors, and fashions— others with body of 
gold, and embroidered with gold; woven stuffs and brocades, of gold and silver 
upon silk of various colors and patterns; quantities of gold and silver thread in 
skeins over thread and silk.. .damasks, satins, taffetans, gorvaranes, pzcotes, and 
other cloths of all colors, some finer and better than others;.. .and white cotton 
cloth of different kinds and qualities, for all uses. They also bring musk, 
benzoin, and ivory; many bed ornaments, hangings, coverlets, and tapestries of 
embroidered velvet; damask and gorvaran of different shades; tablecloths, 
cushions, and carpets; horse-trappings of the same stuff, and embroidered with 
glass beads and seed-pearls; also some pearls and rubies, sapphires and crystal- 
stones; metal basins, copper ketdes, and other copper and cast-iron pots;
65 Blair and Robertson, Vol. Ill, 272.
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quantities of all sorts of nails, sheet-iron, tin and lead; saltpetre and gunpowder.
They supply the Spaniards with wheat flour; preserves made of orange, peach,
scor^onera, pear, nutmeg, and ginger, and other fruits of China; salt pork and
other salt meats; live fowls of good breed, and very fine capons; quantities of
green fruit, oranges of all kinds; excellent chestnuts, walnuts, pears, and chicueyes
(both green and dried, a delicious fruit); quantities of fine thread of all kinds,
needles, and knick-knacks; little boxes and writing-cases; beds, tables, chairs,
and gilded benches, painted in many figures and patterns.. ..The Chinese furnish
numberless other gewgaws and ornaments of little value and worth, which are
esteemed among the Spaniards; besides a quantity of fine crockery of all kinds;
canganes, sines, and black and blue robes; tacley, which are beads of all kinds;
strings of cornelians, and other beads and precious stones of all colors; pepper
and other spices; and rarities—which, did I refer to them all, I would never
67finish, nor have sufficient paper for it.
The variety of merchandise available for purchase and advantageous commercial climate 
of the Philippines during the 1570s prompted some colonial officials to advocate for an increase 
in the number of ships available for use in transpacific trade and an expansion of Spanish 
commerce throughout Southeast Asia. From Manila, Governor Gonzalo Ronquillo de Penalosa 
requested that Philip II command that ships from New Spain be dispatched with greater 
frequency and raised the possibility of expanding transpacific trade to Asian ports outside of the 
Philippines. Ronquillo de Penalosa advocated specifically for the development of trade between 
the Island of Maluccas and the Americas. He noted to the king that Manila Galleons ferrying 
various spices could “touch at Nueva Espana and leave there the amount necessary for that
67 Blair and Robertson, Vol. 16, 232-237.
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kingdom, and in Panama, what is needed for Pirn, the kingdom of Tierra Firme and the new 
kingdom of Granada.” Not content with supplying colonial markets, Penalosa pointed out that 
from Panama Asian spices could easily be re-exported to Spain.68
Governor Penalosa believed that an expansion of transpacific trade would prove 
extremely beneficial for Spain’s colonies in the New World on account of Spanish Manila’s close 
“proximity to China [which was] without doubt.. .the finest country in the world, since it has so 
many people and so great wealth.”69 Acting on this belief, the governor dispatched several ships 
directly to Panama and Peru in the early 1580s. Permission for limited trade between the 
Philippines and ports of Peru, Guatemala and Tierra Firme (the Isthmus of Panama) was granted 
in 1579, leading to the first direct shipment of goods between Manila and Peru two years later.70 
A second ship loaded with artillery and other merchandise set off for the viceroyalty in 1582, 
followed in 1583 by a vessel bound directly for Panama that sailed on account of “private 
individuals.”71
The opening years of the 1580s thus found transpacific commerce expanding both in 
value and volume as direct trade between Manila and ports throughout Spanish America was 
being established. The increasing availability of comparatively lower-priced Asian goods in New 
Spain led to an expansion in inter-Pacific colonial trade to Peru, where silver production was 
spiking. Hard data on this commerce is limited but Woodrow Borah estimates that trade 
amounted to 100,000-120,000 pesos a year in the early 1560s, exceeded 200,000 pesos by the 
opening of the 1570s, and reached a total of over two million pesos annually in the 1590s.72
68 Blair and Robertson, Vol. IV , “Letter from Gonzalo Ronquillo de Penalosa to Felipe II,” 43-45.
69 Blair and Robertson, Vol. V, “Letter from Penalosa to Felipe II,” 19.
70 William Schurz, “Mexico, Peru, and the Manila Galleon,” 395.
71 Blair and Robertson, Vol. V , “Letter from Penalosa to Felipe II,” 24.
72 Woodrow Borah, Early Colonial Trade, 94-95.
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Harry E. Cross provides similar figures for the 1590s and estimates that two to three million
73pesos flowed from Peru to New Spain annually.
Whatever the overall value of commerce between New Spain and Peru was, colonial 
merchants were clearly making sizeable profits by re-exporting Asian goods from Acapulco to 
Lima and other Peruvian markets such as Potosi. One Diego Lopez de Toledo, a small time 
Peruvian merchant in the 1560s had, by the mid 1580s, acquired his own ship and was making
100,000 pesos a year by importing merchandise from Mexico. Woodrow Borah argues that 
increasing sums of capital seemed to have been invested in Pacific commerce at this time, an 
indication that more and more merchants were turning away from the trade in Sevillean imports 
at Veracruz and Panama City.74 Evidendy, commercial profits in the Philippines circa 1583 were 
also healthy enough for Governor Penalosa to raise duties on both imported and exported goods 
with littie protest from Chinese or Spanish merchants. As indicated above, Penalosa emerges 
from the documentary sources as being a key promoter of transpacific commerce during these 
early years, taking it upon himself to actively develop commercial routes. His zeal for expanding 
commerce can be clearly seen in a 1583 letter to Philip II when he promised to send further 
ships to all of “the principal kingdoms held by your Majesty in the Indias and the Southern Sea.”
75
While Penalosa worked to expand commerce from his post in Manila, other servants of 
the Crown were beginning to raise alarm over the growing volume of Chinese goods available in 
colonial markets and the increasing drain of silver to Asia. The Peruvian viceroy Martin 
Enriquez, who had welcomed the first Manila Galleons to Acapulco a decade earlier, was one 
early antagonist of transpacific trade. In a 1583 letter to Philip II he voiced alarm over the 
introduction of lower-priced Chinese goods to Peru. Enriquez specifically feared that the further
73 Harry E. Cross, “South American Bullion Production and Export, 1550-1750,” 412.
74 Woodrow Borah, Early Colonial Trade, 94-95.
75 Blair and Robertson, Vol. V, “Letter from Penalosa to Felipe II,” 24.
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importation of Chinese silks would threaten the sale of Spanish textiles. He went on to inform 
the king that the vessel dispatched by Penalosa in 1582 had brought to Peru a number of goods 
including Chinese porcelain, iron, spices, wax, and various textiles. This, Enriquez pointed out, 
was a clear violation of existing commercial regulation forbidding the direct importation of Asian 
merchandise to Peru.76 Phillip IPs cedula o f 1579, which had permitted direct trade between 
Manila and American ports outside of Acapulco, had stipulated that only military supplies could 
be imported directly from Asia. Furthermore, this limited trade concession had been made in 
light of recent attacks on Spanish colonial ports and shipping lanes by Francis Drake. Its 
purpose, therefore, was to allow for the armament and fortification of Spain’s American colonies 
rather than to offer a royal blessing for the expansion of commerce between Asia and the New 
World.
The potential danger to merchant and royal finances that an expansion of transpacific 
trade posed was not lost on the Philip II. Having united the crowns of Portugal and Spain some 
three years earlier, he now ruled over a truly global empire. Although he remained focused 
primarily on imperial ambitions in Europe, the king was a consummate ruler who readily 
consumed the voluminous reports pouring in from distant regions of his empire. Philip II 
monitored royal finances with equal vigor and therefore understood the importance of the 
Consulado’s monopoly over colonial markets and the general flow of New World silver to
77Spain. While the promise of Asian riches had driven the king to establish a colony in the 
Philippines only two decades earlier, commerce between the New World and China was quickly 
developing into a potential threat to Crown finances. As a result of Enriquez’s reports and 
Governor Penalosa’s promise to dispatch ships to all of Spain’s “principal kingdoms.. .in the 
Indias,” Philip II banned both the sale of Asian goods in Peruvian markets and further voyages
76 William Schurz, “Mexico, Peru, and the Manila Galleon,” 396, Footnote 34.
77 See Geoffrey Parker, The Grand Strategy of Philip II.
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between Manila and Peru.78 While the markets of New Spain were larger than that of Peru, it was
the southern viceroyalty that accounted for the majority New World silver production
throughout the sixteenth-century. As a result, while the number of consumers in Peru was
smaller in comparison to New Spain, they had access to larger supplies of bullion and a capacity
for import consumption that contemporaries described as excessive and luxurious. It is therefore
unsurprising that Philip IPs first decree regulating the Manila Gallon trade network was designed
to safeguard the Consulado’s monopoly over Peruvian markets.
Following the king’s ban, even more sobering news concerning transpacific trade
reached Spain. In 1584, one Melchior Davalos informed Philip II that over four thousand
Chinese resided in Manila and despite “laws forbidding any one to take money out of your
realms.. .every year [they] take away all the money there is .. .as we have no merchandise to give
them, having nothing except reals.”79 Spanish merchants in the Philippines had known from the
earliest years of transpacific trade that any “commerce with [China] must be carried on with
80silver, which [the Chinese] value above all other things.” What had begun as a trickle in the
early 1570s was, by the mid 1580s, a steady and growing stream of wealth.
Gauging the precise value of transpacific trade at this time is difficult, but in 1586 one
81Pedro Rojas estimated that three to five hundred thousand pesos flowed annually to China.
These figures seem conservative given the fact that a year later a returning galleon, the Santa Ana,
carried cargo that, according to the Manila Audiencia, “would have been worth in Mexico two 
82million [pesos].” Furthermore, despite the king’s recent ban on sales of Asian goods in Peru, 
the inter-Pacific trade in these commodities continued to flourish throughout the 1580s. Again,
78 William Schurz, “Mexico, Peru, and the Manila Galleon,” 396, Footnote 35. Woodrow Borah, Early 
Colonial Trade, 118-119.
79 Blair and Robertson, Vol. VI, “Letter from Melchior Davalos to Felipe II,” 54.
80 Blair and Robertson, Vol. Ill, “Affairs in the Philippines After the Death o f Legazpi,” 159.
81 Blair and Robertson, Vol. VI, “Letter o f Pedro de Rojas to Felipe II,” 265.
82 Blair and Robertson, Vol. VI, “Letter from the Manila Audiencia to Felipe II,” 254.
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hard data regarding the value or scope of this commercial activity remains scarce due to a lack of 
scholarly attention but Woodrow Borah estimated that by the early 1590s it may have amounted 
to over two million pesos a year with Asian imports accounting for the vast majority of goods 
being shipped to Peru.83
Spanish citizens of Manila were also expressing their concern to Philip II over the 
expansion of transpacific trade at this time. A general assembly was called in the spring of 1586 
and a long list of grievances drawn up and dispatched to Madrid. Chapter three of this 
memorandum was dedicated to matters of commerce and opened with a request to Philip II that 
he forbid consignments of silver from being sent from New Spain to the Philippines. According 
to the assembly, merchants from Mexico arrived each year with such large supplies of silver that 
they were able to outbid the Spanish citizens of Manila and buy up the majority of Asian goods. 
As a result, Mexican trading companies were in control of transpacific commerce and a large 
amount of silver was lost to China each year. Both outcomes, the assembly believed, were 
detrimental to the well being of Philippines and the interests of the Consulado. To remedy this 
situation, the assembly requested “that only the citizens of these islands be allowed to buy and 
export to Mexico the products of this land and foreign products [and that] if any other person
wish to do this, he should be obliged to become a citizen and reside here at least for three years;
84and he should trade with none but his own property.”
The Cabildo of Manila endorsed these proposed measures, telling the king, “we are 
being totally ruined here through the arrival in this city of merchants, and consignments from 
Mexico.” These officials went on to warn that as a result of this, “the customs duties of Sevilla 
and of Vera Cruz are being decreased and lost, to the great detriment of [Sevillean] 
merchants.. .the royal customs duties are being decreased [and] silver is taken to a country of
83 Woodrow Borah, Early Colonial Trade, 94-95.
84 Blair and Robertson, Vol. VI, “Memorial to the Council by Citizens o f the Filipinas Islands,” 157.
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infidels.” Together, the cabildo and the general assembly argued that by restricting trade with 
Chinese merchants to legal citizens of Manila, transpacific commerce could be limited to “small 
am ounts.. .[and the] resultant loss to this state and to the seigniories of [Philip II]” would come
85to an end. Obviously, individuals in Manila were not concerned entirely with the commercial 
well being of the Consulado or even the king’s finances.86Any decrease in the role of Mexican 
merchants would entail a corresponding increase in their control of transpacific trade and with it, 
commercial profits.
Despite the fact that individuals in the Philippines were acting largely with their own 
interests in mind, they seem to have been genuinely concerned with the drain of silver to Asia. 
Rather than request a ban on transpacific commerce they advocated for a more limited trade 
between Manila and the Americas in locally produced goods. Cotton, wax, honey, and gold for 
example, were singled out as Filipino products that could be exported to the New World in place 
of Asian imports. Even if such goods were exchanged primarily for American silver, Spanish 
officials and citizens argued that the bullion would remain in the Philippines, as opposed to 
being shipped to China, and would thereby help to increase the wealth of the colony.
In a letter accompanying both the cabildo’s and the assembly’s dispatches, Pedro Rojas 
argued that the highly profitable trade with China was actually inhibiting the economic 
development of the Philippines. Due to the abundance of American silver and lower priced 
Asian goods, native Filipinos no longer produced “cloths, lampotes [cotton gauze], cotton, and 
gold, all of which have great value in Nueva Espana.” If commerce with China was curtailed, 
Rojas believed that local production would resume and “the articles sent from Espana to Nueva 
Espana would keep their value [due to the absence of Asian imports] and the gold and silver paid
85 Blair and Robertson, Vol. V I, “Letter from the Manila Cabildo to Felipe II,” 242.
86 Blair and Robertson, Vol. V I, “Memorial to the Council by Citizens o f the Filipinas Islands,” 157. 
Another request was that Philip II allow “the inhabitants o f the islands [to] trade with Piru or any other 
country.”
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for them would remain in [Philip II’s] realm.” Rojas further stated, “it would be of great
importance to your Majesty and the whole country.. .if [Filipino goods] alone formed the
merchandise sent to Nueva Espana from these islands, the gold and silver would remain here,
87and in the hands of the Spaniards themselves.” Although this economic policy sounds 
implausible, the argument that New World bullion would remain in the Philippines if commerce 
with China were suppressed spoke directly to Philip II and the Consulado’s concerns over 
transpacific trade.
As warnings over the drain of silver to Asia and the continued importation of Chinese
wares to the New World reached Madrid, government officials presented Philip II in 1586 with a
report detailing the threat posed by transpacific trade. According to these officials, lower-priced
88wares from the Philippines readily undersold Spanish imports in American markets. As a result,
“trade in fabrics imported from these kingdoms [Spain] to that land [the New World] is steadily
decreasing, on account of the trade which is carried on there with the Philippine Islands.” As a
consequence, large amounts of silver were lost to Asia and “the commerce of these kingdoms
[Spain] is falling away, and the bringing of money hither is impeded [because] the lure of the
cheapness of the [Chinese] merchandise overcomes all considerations.” In terms of future action
in regards to transpacific commerce, they advised Philip II that “the trade and commerce of the
said islands, as far as said merchandise is concerned, should be abolished, and that these wares
should not be carried to Nueva Espana or other parts of the Indias, in order that the trade of
89these kingdoms —a most important matter — may continue.”
Philip II wasted little time in following through on the recommendations of his officials.
87 Blair and Robertson, Vol. VI, “Letter o f Pedro Rojas to Felipe II,” 265.
88 Blair and Robertson, Vol. VI, “Measures Regarding Trade with China,” 279. There is a strong focus in 
this report on the underselling o f Spanish textiles by Chinese imports however, it is clear that Spanish 
officials are not only talking about Chinese silk. “He [Viceroy Enriquez] says, moreover, that all goods 
carried from the islands are mere trifles, from which the land derives no profit — such as porcelains, 
escritoires, caskets, fans, and parasols.”
89 Blair and Robertson, Vol. VI, “Measures Regarding Trade with China,” 279.
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In 1586, all trade between the Philippines and China was suspended indefinitely and the selling 
of imported Chinese wares in American markets forbidden. By the mid 1580s, trade between the 
New World and China had come to be perceived as a serious threat to the Consulado’s control 
over Spanish. American markets and with it, Crown finances. As a result, Philip II chose to ban 
all commerce between China and Manila. In a written response to the king, however, Viceroy 
Villamanrrique of New Spain downplayed the value of the Manila Galleon trade. He called the 
“silk, both raw and woven, cotton cloth, iron, copper, earthenware, and other things of no great 
worth” that are shipped from Manila a mere “annoyance.” He went on to argue that the end of 
trade with China would curtail the spread of Catholicism, result in the eventual loss of the 
Philippines, and bring about a decline of Spain’s power in Asia. Having made his case for 
continuing transpacific commerce, Villamanrrique closed his letter by stating “I have seen fit to 
disregard your Majesty’s orders” concerning further trade with China.90 The viceroy was not 
alone in his refusal to enforce Philip II’s ban and the royal cedula of 1586 became a dead letter 
upon its arrival.
Although Villamanrrique may have been sincere in regards to continuing the spread of 
Catholicism and Spain’s power in Asia, it is clear that the value of New Spain’s trade with Manila 
shaped his decision to ignore the king’s order. Villamanrrique had admitted as much to Philip II 
earlier in 1586 when he reveled in a letter that the re-export of Asian goods to Peru “had become 
a very important part of Mexican trade.” The viceroy’s seemingly cavalier dismissal of royal 
orders is hardly surprising. Despite the 1582 ban on the shipment of Asian wares to Peru, he and 
other officials had not only had allowed the trade to continue but saw to it that said goods were 
officially registered and taxed in both New Spain and Peru. 91
90 Blair and Robertson, Vol. V I, “Letter from Marques de Villamanrrique to Felipe II,” 280-289.
91 Woodrow Borah, Early Colonial Trade, 119.
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For Philip II, controlling, let alone suspending transpacific trade would prove most 
difficult. Doing so required surmounting the standard obstacles of distance, time and imperfect 
information that rulers of the period faced when governing over large imperial domains. Philip II 
was not only forced to grapple with these issues on a global scale but at a time of increasing 
interconnectedness and interdependency. To safeguard the Consulado’s control over colonial 
markets and the flow of large silver remittances to Spain he had to prevent New World bullion 
from being exchanged for Asian merchandise. The rapid development of transpacific trade in the 
1570s and 1580s, however, impacted not just Spanish imperial policy but global trade routes as 
well.
Com m ercial Expansion and Rivalry
As the first decade and a half of transpacific commerce came to a close, the trade in 
Asian wares and New World silver had come to exercise a significant impact on the regional 
economies and merchant communities of both Asia and the Americas. As discussed above, the 
high value of silver in China and demand for imports in Spanish America caused an increasing 
sum of New World mining production to gravitate towards Manila. Asian and European 
merchants quickly followed suit, seeking to settle or establish factors in the Spanish colonial 
capital. The emergence of Spanish Manila as a commercial entrepot in the 1580s marked a shift 
in regional and global trade patterns. At the same time, the Manila Galleon trade network altered 
patterns of consumption and production throughout the Pacific Rim.
Prior to the opening of transpacific trade, Chinese merchants were involved in foreign 
commerce primarily as a means to acquire silver. As a result, production in the southern coastal 
provinces of Fujian, Guangdong, and Zhejiang was heavily oriented towards foreign markets by 
the late 1500s. While the New World represented only one of several export markets for Chinese
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goods, trade between China and Manila grew considerably in the 1570s. By the early 1580s,
James Boyajian argues that “more silver was reaching China via the Pacific from Peru than from
i . 99any other single source.”
In Manila, New World silver was exchanged for a variety of goods, including Chinese 
ceramics. At this time, increasing quantities of lower priced, mass-produced ceramics and finer 
porcelain pieces were becoming available to consumers in Spanish American markets. While the 
majority of these pieces were decorated with traditional Chinese motifs, Chinese producers also 
copied Western designs and even accepted custom orders from European merchants. Shortly 
after the Spanish consolidated their presence in the Philippines, Chinese ceramic and glass pieces 
decorated with Philip II’s coat of arms began to appear.93 Whether bearing Chinese or European 
designs, these goods were readily bought by colonial consumers and influenced local artisans 
throughout the Americas. N ot only did Chinese ceramics represent valuable commodities, they 
frequently served as convenient ballast for Manila Galleons.
The export of silk thread and cloth, driven partly by the Single Whip reform of 1581, 
was also a burgeoning rural industry along the Chinese coast that saw an increasing volume of its 
production shipped across the Pacific. Like ceramics, Chinese textiles were exported throughout 
Asia, as well as Europe and parts o f Africa. The expansion of transpacific trade in the late 1500s, 
however, quickly transformed Manila into one of the principal destinations for Chinese silks.94
92 James C. Boyajian, Portuguese Trade in Asia Under the Habsburgs, 64.
93 George Kuwayama, “Chinese Ceramics in Colonial Latin America” (PhD diss., University o f Michigan, 
2002), 17-18, 40.
94 “Souza cites Bocarro, a seventeenth-century Portuguese historian who estimated that China produced 
some 36,000 to 47,000 picols (i.e. almost 2,500 tons) o f silk per year early in the seventeenth century, one- 
third o f which (i.e. 12,000 picols), about 800 tons, was exported. The vast majority o f the exported silk 
went to Japan, Manila, and India.” Dennis Flynn and Arturo Giraldez, “Silk for Silver: Manila-Macao 
Trade in the 17th Century,” Philippines Studies 44 (1996): 54.
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The Portuguese merchant and economic writer Duarte Gomes Solis reflected in 1622 that 
demand for Chinese textiles at Manila caused the price of silk to rise in China.95
Like Spain’s Philip II, China’s Ming emperors sought to exercise as much control over 
foreign commerce as possible. Merchants in China were forced to acquire a government license 
before conducting trade with foreign states. Following the Spanish conquest of Manila Bay, 
Chinese merchants called for an increase in the number of government licenses available for 
trade with the Philippines. In 1589, the Ming government conceded to the merchants’ demands 
by creating a new regulatory system and awarding a substantial number of foreign trade licenses 
to merchants going to Spanish Manila. According to Richard von Glahn, out of a total of 88, “by 
far the largest number — 16 — was reserved for Luzon (as many as Batavia, Siam, Palembang, and 
Cochin combined; no other destination was allotted more than 2 licenses).” 96 Therefore, by the 
late 1500s the Philippines had emerged as a major, if not one of the most prominent foreign 
destinations for Chinese merchants.
Chinese traders were not alone in being drawn to Manila in the 1580s. Portuguese 
merchants based in Macao in southern China were also busy trying to establish themselves in the 
Philippines. Like their Chinese counterparts, these merchants sought to acquire supplies of silver 
in order to expand their inter-Asian commercial dealings. While the Portuguese shipment of 
Asian commodities to Europe via the Cape Route, known as the Carreira trade, was extremely 
profitable, the value and volume of goods traded within Asia by Portuguese merchants, or 
casados, dwarfed that of the former. Since the first decades of the 1500s, Portuguese merchants 
had conducted trade with China, Japan, and other East Asian states independent of the Crown- 
controlled Estado da India. Referred to as the casado trade, recent scholarship has shown that 
Portuguese merchants in Asia concerned themselves primarily with Asian commerce as opposed
95 Duarte Gomes Solis, Discursos sobre los comercios de las dos Indias, ed. Moses Bensabat Amzalak (Lisbon: 
1943), 67.
96 Richard von Glahn, fountain ojFortune, 118-119.
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to the importation of Asian wares to Europe.97 In East Asia, the highly profitable casado trade 
centered on Macao, a small island in the Pearl River delta region of southern China. From this 
location, Portuguese merchants were able to reap enormous commercial profits by exchanging 
Chinese silk and gold for Japanese silver. Following the Ming dynasty’s ban on direct foreign 
trade with Japan in 1567, the Portuguese enjoyed a near monopoly over the importation of 
Japanese silver to China.
Spanish colonization of the Philippines and the beginning of transpacific trade in the 
1570s was greeted with hostility in Macao because it threatened the Portuguese commercial 
position in terms of both inter-Asian trade circuits and, to a lesser extent, the importation of 
Asian commodities to Europe. Following their failed attempts to expel the Spanish by force 
from Manila and the Philippines in general, the Portuguese lobbied Ming officials and requested 
that they deny Spanish merchants the right to trade directly with China. The union of Portugal 
and Spain under Philip II in 1580, however, complicated the Portuguese-Spanish commercial 
rivalry in East Asia. As already noted, this union created a truly global empire. As a result, Philip 
II not only controlled kingdoms, colonies, and commercial outposts throughout Europe, Africa, 
Asia, and the New World, he also held a dominant position over long-distance commercial trade 
in the Adantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans. The Spanish-Portuguese Empire, however, was not 
perfectly unified. Rather than a fusion o f the two empires, the Iberian union constituted little 
more than a uniting of Spain and Portugal under one ruler. While the two may have shared 
enemies and foreign policy after 1580, Portugal remained a distinct political unit within the larger 
Spanish imperial framework. In practice, this meant that despite pledging allegiance to Philip II, 
Portugal retained control over its internal governance like the kingdom of Aragon and the city of 
Barcelona, as well as its foreign commerce.
97 James C. Boyajian, Portuguese Trade in A sia under the Habsburgs, 53.
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In terms of global trade patterns, Philip II sought to safeguard the commercial interests 
of merchants in both Seville and Lisbon within the larger Spanish-Portuguese Empire. The 
purpose of this policy was to preserve the respective commercial monopoly of each group and 
thereby guarantee two reliable income streams for the Crown. The goal of Philip’s commercial 
policy was for the Consulado to continue to extract high profit margins from trade with the New 
World while Lisbon merchants maintained control over the slave trade in the Adantic and 
commerce with Asia via the Cape route. While dealing in African slaves delivered large profits to 
Portuguese merchants, Portuguese trade with Asia constituted the main source of royal income. 
This revenue stream was based on import taxes levied on Asian goods and the royal monopoly 
on pepper. Rather than manage Asian commerce direcdy or create a legal institution like the 
Consulado, the king of Portugal had granted limited contracts to consortiums o f private 
merchants. These merchants managed trade with Asia and imported pepper on the king’s 
account. Each year, profits from the sale of pepper were delivered directly to the king of 
Portugal, leaving merchants to reap profits from the sale of all other imported goods minus the
98royal import tax.
Upon assuming the throne of Portugal, Philip II showed little interest in altering existing 
trade with Asia. The practice of granting contracts to consortiums of Portuguese merchants 
continued, providing Philip II with a second, albeit limited stream of income to further his 
imperial designs in Europe." Following the union, the Portuguese at Macao were quick to lobby 
their new sovereign to safeguard their commercial position in Asia. They requested specifically 
that Philip II prohibit further efforts by Spanish officials in Manila to expand political and 
commercial ties with China. 100 At the same time, however, Portuguese merchants sought to
98 For an excellent overview o f  Portuguese trade in Asia before and throughout the Iberian union, see 
James C. Boyajian, Portuguese Trade in A sia under the Hapshurgs.
99 James C. Boyajian, Portuguese Trade in Asia under the Hapshurgs, 19-20.
100 George Souza, The Survival of Empire; Portuguese Trade and Society in China and the South China Sea, 1630-
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establish trade with Manila and even sought to draw Manila Galleons loaded with New World
silver to Macao. Despite failing to secure direct trade between Macao and the New World,
Portuguese traders succeeded in augmenting the supply of silver for use in inter-Asian trade by
contact with Manila. This in turn enabled the Portuguese to acquire more Asian wares for export
to Europe.101 Although Portuguese merchants in Macao sought to establish trade with both
Manila and the New World during the 1580s, they were operating largely outside the control of
the Estado da India and the regulations governing Portuguese trade in Asia. Like the Consulado,
Portuguese merchants in Lisbon viewed the emergence of the Manila Galleon trade network as a
growing threat to their commercial interests in Asia.
Across the Pacific, the development of transpacific trade was having a similar impact on
the economies and merchant communities of the New World. For one, the commerce served as
a stimulant to colonial industries such as silk weaving in New Spain. As Woodrow Borah showed
in his classic 1943 study, prior to the establishment of Manila, Mexican sericulture had been
unable to meet the demand of local silk guilds for thread. After 1579 large supplies of silk thread
102and dyes from China began to arrive, leading to an increase in silk textile production. Colonial 
shipbuilding was likewise stimulated by transpacific trade, as it increased the demand for vessels 
to both ply the Pacific and the coastal trade routes connecting Mexico and the markets of 
Central and South America.
As noted already, imported Asian merchandise helped to fill the growing consumer 
demand for manufactures throughout Spanish America. This not only disrupted the Consulado’s 
monopolistic control over colonial markets but also sparked a bitter feud between colonial 
merchants in New Spain and Peru. The main point of contention between Mexican and Peruvian
1754 (New York: Cambridge University Press,1986), 65-68.
101 James C. Boyajian, Portuguese Trade in Asia under the Habsburgs, 84-85,
102 Woodrow Borah, Silk Kaising in Colonial Mexico (Los Angeles, CA: University o f California Press, 1943), 
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merchants was who would supply South American markets. While the markets of Mexico and 
Central America had always demanded larger supplies of imported goods than the Consulado 
shipped, Peru had remained by far the most under-stocked. Its consumers were, by the last third 
o f the sixteenth-century, also becoming unrivaled in their taste for and capacity to consume 
manufactures and luxury wares. By the 1580s, imported Asian goods were widely available on the 
Calle de Mercaderes in Lima, where, according to Viceroy Monterrey “people live most 
luxuriously.”103 Francesco Carletti also observed the consumption patterns of Peruvians during 
his visit to Lima in the 1590s. There he noted, “many household of important Spanish gentlemen 
and merchants [who] live with more cleanliness and splendor than in any other part of the West 
Indies.” Carletti, however, observed not only wealthy Peruvians living luxuriously, but African 
slaves as well, who “on festive days.. .go about superbly dressed in silk and with pearls, and even 
gold.” 104 The heralded buying power of Peruvians was still evident in the 1620s when the 
governor of the Philippines estimated that the viceroyalty could absorb two million pesos’ worth 
of Chinese textiles a year.105
Following the end of Penalosa’s short-lived expansion of transpacific commercial 
routes, Acapulco emerged as the main theatre where the Mexican-Peruvian rivalry was to play 
out. While merchants from New Spain possessed the advantage of a strong and direct 
commercial link to Manila, their Peruvian counterparts had access to larger supplies of capital 
due to the immense silver output of Potosi. As a result, Peruvian merchants were frequently able 
to outbid their Mexican rivals at Acapulco and carry away a large share of Asian imports.106 Once 
again, Francesco Carletti’s experience of arriving to Acapulco in the mid-1590s testifies to this. 
Having sold his merchandise in Lima for bars of silver, the Florentine sailed to New Spain where
103 William Schurz, The Manila Galleon, 365.
104 Francesco Carletti, My Voyage Around the World, 39-40.
105 Richard Garner, “Where Did All the Silver Go?,” 78-79.
106 Woodrow Borah, Early Colonial Trade, 122.
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he hoped to exchange the silver for goods that could be re-exported to Peru. After arriving, he 
noted how local “women of the world” had a saying to the effect of “let the jinens out and the 
sancudos in [which] refers to the Peruvians, almost as if to say; ‘Get out, you small-town folk and 
rustics. People weightier and more splendid than you are coming.’ And in fact that is what
107happens, because o f the quantities of silver which the Peruvians bring to buy various goods.”
New Christian Portuguese merchants were also active in transpacific and inter-colonial 
trade networks throughout the 1580s, and constituted a small but well-connected and well- 
financed rival faction to Peruvian and Mexican traders. Following the union of Spain and 
Portugal, small communities of New Christian Portuguese merchants began to appear in Manila 
and major trade centers throughout the New World. With their commercial and familial 
networks that literally encircled the globe, these merchants were able to profitably trade in 
standard global commodities such as silk and spices along with small, niche luxury items like 
diamonds, pearls, and colored gemstones. Like all New Christian merchants, those operating out 
of Spanish-controlled territories throughout this period lived a precarious existence and were 
under the near-constant threat o f prosecution by the Inquisition. Nonetheless, these merchants 
imported millions of pesos’ worth of Asian wares to the New World and distributed them via 
colonial trade circuits.
As the efforts of both European and Asian merchants demonstrate, the decade and half 
following the establishment of Spanish Manila witnessed quantitative and qualitative changes in 
Southeast Asian and Spanish American trade routes. The demand for New World silver drove 
increasing number of Chinese and Portuguese traders to the Philippines. Colonial and, to a lesser 
extent, New Christian Portuguese merchants in turn converged on both Spanish Manila and 
Acapulco in order to satisfy the appetite Spanish American consumers for imported
107 Francesco Carletti, My Voyage Around the World, 56-57.
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commodities. Although significant, the expansion of transpacific commerce during this period 
only laid the foundation for further development in the coming decades.
G alleons in a Silver Sink: 1586 - 1604
‘The King of China could build a palace with the silver bars from Peru which have been carried to his country ' 
because of that traffic, without their having been registered, and without the King of Espana having been paid his 
duties. ”— from The Relation ofHieronimo de Banuelosy Carrillo, 1638.108
With the king’s cedula banning trade between the Philippines and China being ignored, 
Manila Galleons continued to ply the Pacific after 1586. Like the first decade and half following 
the establishment of Spanish Manila, the waning years of the sixteenth-century witnessed various 
groups and individuals trying to augment the number of commercial routes and vessels involved 
in transpacific trade. But while some merchants and government officials promoted the 
expansion of the Manila Galleon trade network, the Consulado and, by the late 1580s, the 
Portuguese called increasingly for its suppression. As the overall value of the trade increased 
throughout the late 1580s and 1590s, the pressure on Philip II, and later Philip III, to stem the 
loss of silver to China and the flow of Asian merchandise to colonial markets continued to 
mount.
Following his refusal to enforce the king’s 1586 decree, Viceroy Villamanrrique of New 
Spain worked earnestly to increase the number of vessels completing annually voyages to and 
from the Philippines. In his dispatches to Madrid, the Mexican viceroy communicated his efforts 
to foster the development of a privately owned, transpacific commercial fleet for the benefit of 
the Crown. Writing in 1587, the Viceroy told Philip II, that it is “very im portant.. .for your
108 Blair and Robertson, Vol. XXIV , “The Relation of Hieronimo de Banuelos y Carrillo,” 71.
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Majesty’s service that trading in the Philipinas should be carried on through the hands of the 
merchants; that they should maintain ships, in order to relieve your Majesty from so great and 
heavy expense as you are under.” To this end, the Viceroy had begun to auction off royally 
owned vessels to private individuals who promised to keep them involved in trade with Asia “as 
long as [they] hold together.” He also suggested to Philip II that the Crown could net a si2eable 
profit by building and selling galleons to colonial merchants in New Spain. Both the selling of 
existing ships and construction of new ones were part of Villamanrrique’s overall designs for an 
expanded transpacific commercial space dominated by private merchants from New Spain. The 
viceroy believed that by encouraging the development of private transpacific commerce, 
“conditions [in the Pacific] will finally come to be like those in the Northern Sea [the Atlantic].”
109
New Spain was not the only Spanish colony to see an increase in shipbuilding as a result 
of the expansion of transpacific trade in the late 1580s. In the Philippines, Governor Santiago de 
Vera was, like his counterpart in New Spain, overseeing the construction of Manila Galleons. As 
o f June 1587, Vera reported that “a fine galley of five hundred toneladas” was complete which 
raised the number of ships in the Philippines suitable for transpacific crossings to five. Vera 
informed the King, “trade continues to increase, so that, were vessels not lacking, a great 
quantity of goods would be sent to Nueva Espana.” In the same letter, Vera requested additional 
funds to cover the construction and outfitting of ships for coastal defense and trade with New 
Spain. Vera was quick to note that vessels “can be constructed very easily, and at but a little 
expense” in Manila.110 The Manila suburb of Cavite would in fact become a major center of 
shipbuilding in the coming decades and would soon turn out galleons well in excess of 1000 
tons’ burden.
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While the addition of new galleons and development of private shipping in the Pacific
helped to further commerce, merchants and government officials also pushed to establish direct
trade routes between China and the New World. With the approval of Villamanrrique, both the
San Martin and the Santa A.na sailed from Acapulco to Macao in 1587 and 1588.'11 A year later,
the ban on direct trade between Peru and Asia may have been flouted when “a ship from
112
Panama or Piru, prepared to lay out a large sum of money, arrived at Macao.” Spanish 
merchants were not the only ones bypassing Manila at this time. In both 1584 and 1589 
Portuguese vessels set out from Macao bound for New Spain. Upon arrival at Acapulco, the 
captain of the 1589 voyage Joao da Gama, was immediately detained and had his sizeable cargo 
of merchandize confiscated by Mexican authorities. Despite the loss of its captain, the 
Portuguese vessel completed its return to Macao successfully and netted a sizeable profit thanks
113to American silver.
Although Macao remained a Portuguese trading post throughout the union of Portugal 
and Spain, there is reason to suspect that a small number of Spanish merchants may have 
established themselves on the island by the late 1580s. In 1589, the Portuguese viceroy o f India 
Manuel de Sousa Coutinho wrote to Philip II concerning the continued violation of the ban on 
trade between China and New Spain. Singling out Portuguese officials in Macao for aiding this 
commerce, Coutinho informed the king that he had dispatched troops and ordered the expulsion 
of Spanish merchants from the outpost. This, he told his sovereign, would ensure “that only the 
original Portuguese citizens shall remain in Machao [and] will do away with any further occasion 
for vessels to go there from Nueva Espana.”114
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113 George Souza, The Survival of Empire, 68. O.H.K. Spate, The Spanish Take, 163.
114 Blair and Robertson, Vol. V II, “Excerpt o f  a Letter from the Viceroy o f India,” 70-71.
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The push by Spanish and Portuguese merchants to expand transpacific trade routes 
beyond the standard Manila-Acapulco run was ultimately unsuccessful, as these initial voyages 
failed to inaugurate regular, direct trade between China and the Americas. This flurry of 
commercial activity in the late 1580s was not lost on the Consulado, though. For Sevillean 
merchants, Philip II’s preliminary attempts to suppress transpacific trade had done little to ease 
their anxiety over the availability of Asian imports in colonial markets. Trade with Chinese 
merchants persisted despite the 1586 ban and a steady stream of reports detailing the expansion 
of the Manila Galleon trade network continued to arrive in Spain.
In order to defend their commercial monopoly over colonial markets, the Consulado 
began to place increasing pressure on Philip II to follow up on his 1586 cedula. In 1589 the 
Consulado wrote to the king, “when the fleets from Castille arrive [to the New World] they now 
have less sale for their goods, since the market is supplied by cheaper merchandise from China, 
and the Philippines. This results in great damage and prejudice to the royal revenues, and is a 
grave blow to the commerce, since it is clear that the fleets to do not go so heavily laden as 
formerly, nor do they bring back so much gold and silver on return.”115 There was undoubtedly 
some exaggeration in the Consulado’s report but it is clear that Sevillean merchants were facing 
stiff competition in colonial markets from Asian imports. One of the challenges for future 
research is to determine the extent of this competition.
Along with the Consulado, Portuguese officials in Lisbon were also beginning to voice 
their concerns over transpacific trade. In 1590, Philip II received a letter explaining in detail how 
the continuation of commerce between Asia and the New World constituted a threat to 
Portugal’s commercial empire in the Far East. The Portuguese were quick to remind Philip II 
that it was their forefathers’ blood and treasure that had won control of Asian trade for the royal 
crown. Castilian merchants in Manila, however, were now threatening to seize control of this
115 Quoted in William Schurz, The Manila Galleon, 405.
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commerce. According to officials in Lisbon, Portuguese garrisons, fleets, and trading posts in 
Asia were maintained primarily through income derived from trade with China. If transpacific 
trade was allowed to continue, “the income from the customs duties, on which Yndia is 
supported, will necessarily be lost. Nor will there be money or forces with which many large 
fleets may be organized by his Majesty for its preservation and defense, or with which to pay the 
soldiery stationed there.”116
Having explained the danger that transpacific trade posed to their own interests, the 
Portuguese went on to warn Philip II of the potential threat to Spain’s continued dominance of 
the New World. “When Chinese merchandise is in the western Indies [the Americas] and money 
is flowing to China, trade and commerce with Hispana will necessarily fall off, together with the 
income of the custom house at Sevilla, while money will be scare there and throughout Espana.” 
The decrease in trade between Spain and its colonies and with it the profit of the Consulado, was 
not the only danger that the Portuguese sought to draw Phillip II’s attention to. “If navigation is 
permitted from the western Indias to China, all the money and coin in the kingdom will flow 
thither and none will go to Hespana. [As a result] the Indias will come to have no need of 
Hespaha, because all the products obtained from this country can be obtained from China in 
much great abundance and more cheaply.”117 According to the Portuguese, Philip II risked 
losing economic control of his American colonies unless transpacific trade was suppressed.
The warnings from the Consulado and the Portuguese cannot be considered objective. 
Each was seeking to safeguard their own commercial interests by raising alarm over the 
importation of Asian goods to the New World via the ‘nao de la China’ trade network. Their 
reports to Philip II, however, echoed information emanating from Peru during the same period. 
In a series of dispatches spanning the years 1590-1594, Viceroy Canete informed Philip II that
1.6 Blair and Robertson, 'Vol. VII, “Letter from Portugal to Felipe II,” 190.
1.7 Blair and Robertson, Vol. VII, “Letter from Portugal to Felipe II,” 190.
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lower priced Asian goods were readily available in Peruvian markets and they were underselling
Spanish imports. By 1592, taxes collected on imported Asian goods from New Spain at El Callao
118were said to have equaled those regularly collected on Spanish merchandise. Equally alarming 
was the news that despite a recent interruption in the supply of goods from Seville, Peruvian 
merchants withheld a sizable volume of European imports. These goods were reportedly 
becoming increasingly harder to sell due to the availability and lower price of Asian merchandise.
Echoing Enriquez a decade earlier, Canete also noted that the cheapness of Chinese silks 
resulted in “Indian caciques and even commoners.. .using them for clothing instead of [locally 
produced] cloth.”119 The widespread consumption of Chinese silk in Peru provides supporting 
evidence to the report of Governor Gomez Perez Dasmarinas of the Philippines that by 1592
190the importation of textiles from Manila had come to exceed those from Spam. “ Unlike the
Portuguese or members of the Consulado, Viceroy Canete cannot be considered an enemy of
transpacific trade. Like other colonial officials, he lobbied the Crown on behalf of local
merchants, requesting that three to four vessels be allowed to sail directly between Lima and
Manila in 1590. Rather than wait for permission from Philip II, he dispatched a ship to the
121Philippines later that year, sending with it a substantial amount of his own money. Canete’s 
reports do not completely validate the expressed concerns of the Consulado or the Portuguese 
but they do indicate that their fears may have been based on actual developments in colonial 
markets.
Faced with the continuing drain of silver to Asia, the flow of Chinese imports to the 
Americas, and the increasing warnings from his subjects concerning these trends, Philip II was
118 Woodrow Borah, Early Colonial Trade, 151, Footnote 146.
119 Woodrow Borah, Early Co Ionia I Trade, 120-121.
120 Blair and Robertson, Vol. VII, “Three Letters from Luis Perez Dasmarinas to Felipe II,” 267.
121 “Canete himself admitted to sending 8,000 ducats on the vessel for investment on his own account, the
amount being that o f a permit he had to import merchandise each year from Spain without tax.”
Woodrow Borah, Early Colonial Trade, 118.
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forced to yet again attempt to gain control of transpacific commerce. In a 1593 decree the king
stated, “as the merchants and other persons in the Northern Sea who trade in these our
kingdoms of Castilla, and in the Yndias, have suffered so many losses during past years, and
those engaged in the profits of the Chinese trade have gained so much, the latter has increased
122greatly, while the commerce of these my said kingdoms has declined.” To preserve the 
Consulado’s trade monopoly and the Portuguese commercial position in Asia, Philip II reissued 
past restrictions and extended existing regulations on transpacific trade. Once again, all trade in 
oriental goods between New Spain, Peru, and Tierra Firme was strictly forbidden. To limit the 
drain of silver and flow of Asian goods to New Spain, a series of new regulations on transpacific 
shipping was introduced. Galleons leaving Mexico would henceforth be allowed to carry only
250,000 pesos’ worth of silver or goods while on the return trip from Manila the value of all 
cargo could not exceed 500,000 pesos. Furthermore, only two ships with a total carrying capacity
123of 300 toneladas would be allowed to ply the trade route each year.
In response to the regulations of 1593, Viceroy Villamanrrique did not, on this occasion, 
write to the king that he “saw fit to disregard” them. Nonetheless, successfully enforcing the 
decree and through it severely limiting commerce between Asia and the New World would prove 
to be as difficult as ever. It was not just the lure of lower priced merchandise that was now 
driving colonial merchants towards transpacific trade but the actions of the Philip II and events 
in the Atlantic as well. In 1590, the Crown’s deteriorating financial position and mounting 
military expenditures had driven Philip II to confiscate all private consignments of silver en route 
to Spain. A royal declaration was published throughout Spanish America to reassure the 
merchant community that this was a one-time occurrence driven by extraordinary events. Both
122 Blair and Robertson, Vol. VII, “Restrictions on Commerce,” 298-300.
123 Robert Reed, Hispanic Urbanism in the Philippines: A. study of the Impact of Church and State (Manila: The 
University o f  Manila, 1967), 125-126.
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Charles V and Philip II had, however, regularly confiscated private silver remittances to Spain 
and the practice would continue in the future.124
Instability in Europe was also a growing concern for both Peruvian and Mexican 
merchants. Prolonged war with the English and Dutch impacted transatlantic shipping during 
the 1590s, placing further strains on colonial merchants involved in trade with Seville. Repeated 
attempts by Spain’s rivals to capture a Spanish treasure fleet returning from the Indies increased 
the cost of transatlantic shipping while also highlighting Spain’s difficulties in protecting Atlantic 
trade routes. Frequent assaults by the English on the Azores and, in 1596, the port of Cadiz also 
interrupted the departure times of Spanish fleets bound for the New World and increased the 
likelihood of encountering strong tropical storms or hurricanes. As a result of these 
developments, colonial merchants conducting trade with Seville faced mounting commercial 
uncertainty, difficulty in securing shipment of merchandise, and increasingly longer waits on 
returns from their commercial investments.125 In a 1594 letter to Philip II, Viceroy Canete 
touched upon each of these developments, offering a poignant summary of the commercial 
climate in the Americas.
The merchants of the entire realm (and particularly those of this city) 
complain continually of the multitude of taxes they pay in Spain and Panama, of 
the abuses and incontinences they suffer, and of the lack of security for their 
property on the journey. As a result, they now make their purchases in New 
Spain, for the voyage between the port where purchases are made [Acapulco] 
and here avoids all the expense and risk of going to Spain. This year and last a
124 Mauricio Drelichman argues that “a plausible conjecture is that the Crown’s willingness to confiscate 
private treasure to defray expenses might have constituted an implicit guarantee on its overall credit 
worthiness” with European bankers. “All That Glitters; Precious Metals, Rent Seeking and the Decline of 
Spain,” European Review of Economic History, 9 (2005): 313-336.
125 Woodrow Borah, Early Colonial Trade, 95, 121, 156 Footnote 26.
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dozen ships have sailed to Mexico, leaving this colony swept clean o f silver.
Although in my administration, your majesty has been sent larger remittances 
on treasury account that in any other, remittances [to Spain] by private people 
are much smaller than before. The silver that used to be sent in the Tierra Firme
fleets, goes now to New Spain Chinese merchandise is so cheap and Spanish
goods so dear that I believe it impossible to choke off the trade to such an 
extent that no Chinese ware will be consumed in this realm.126
More archival research is needed before a precise understanding of colonial merchant 
activity can be gained for this period but a general trend can be gleaned from Canete’s reports 
and other sources. There appears to have been a growing independent streak in colonial 
merchant communities. Both Peruvian and Mexican merchants began to distance themselves 
from the interests of their Sevillean counterparts and resisted efforts by the Crown to gain 
control over their commercial activity. While Canete’s letter dealt with the plight of Peruvian 
merchants, those of New Spain faced similar obstacles to trade with Seville. Many undoubtedly 
responded in the same manner and began shifting their attention and resources to trade with 
Asia. Their numbers were significant: some 246 individual Mexican merchants were involved in
127commerce with Manila by the 1590s. The majority of merchants in Mexico may have 
continued to hold strong commercial and familial ties to Seville but by the late sixteenth-century 
some had begun to distance themselves from the Consulado by establishing local guilds in New
] 7 8Spain. " In Mexico City, a local consulado was established in 1594 and, according to Robert 
Smith, by the early 1600s it openly “advocated freedom of trade in the Pacific area, [although]
126 Quoted in Woodrow Borah, Early Colonial Trade, 121-122.
127 Louisa Hoberman, Mexico's Merchant Elite, 39.
128 Etsuko Miyata Rodriguez, “The Early Manila Galleon Trade: Merchants’ Networks and Markets in 
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Mexico.” In Donna Pierce, ed. Asia <& Spanish America: Trans-Pacific 
Artistic and Cultural Exchange, 1500-1850 (Denver, CO: Denver Art Museum, 2000), 43.
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not on general principles, but for the benefit of merchants and shippers belonging to the 
guild.”129
In Peru, merchants refused in 1594 to follow their Mexican counterparts in organizing a 
local consulado. While their reasons for doing so remain unclear, it is likely that they believed 
forming a merchant guild would render them increasingly vulnerable to forced donations and 
other financial concessions at the hands of the Crown.130 It is also possible that smaller 
merchants specializing in inter-Pacific colonial trade feared that commercial elites with strong 
ties to Seville would dominate a consulado in Lima. Both concerns were legitimate, and their 
refusal to form a merchant guild was likely influenced by a desire to safeguard their access to 
Asian wares at Acapulco.
To the consternation of Mexican, Peruvian, and some Portuguese merchants, free trade 
in the 1590s was not of course, a reality. The latest push by Philip II to restrict trade with China 
was therefore met with an increasing turn to contraband trading in both silver and Asian goods. 
In 1597, the lawyer and colonial official Antonio de Morga informed the King that the heavily 
loaded San Felipe had been forced to anchor at Japan while in route to Acapulco. Once in port, 
“the emperor of that country, Taycosama [Go-Yozei], covetous of the treasure with which it was 
laden, took it all.” According to Morga, the treasure was worth around 1.5 million pesos, three
131times the legal limit. In 1599, Governor Tello of the Philippines wrote to Philip III concerning 
a group of Peruvian merchants who had recendy arrived “loaded down with money to be 
registered— although the fiscal of your royal Audiencia and another royal official, who went to 
inspect the ships, could not find any proof, as the money had all been taken out before they
129 Robert Smith, “The Institution o f the Consulado in N ew  Spain,” Hispanic American Historical Review, 24 
(1944): 64, 67-68, 70.
130 John Melzer, Bastion of Commerce in the City of Kings: The Consulado de Comercio de Uma 1593-1887 (Lima, 
Peru: Editorial Concytec Peru Press, 1991), 8-9.
131 Blair and Robertson, Vol. X, “Letter from Antonio de Morga to Felip II,” 25.
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arrived.” 132 While the exact amount of silver bullion these merchants had brought to Manila 
remains unknown, their haste to unload it before officials could board their ship leaves little 
doubt that it was beyond the legal limit. The Italian merchant Francesco Carletti also testified to 
the ease and regularity o f transpacific smuggling in an account of his and his father’s journey 
from Acapulco to Manila in 1596. Having arranged for passage on a galleon as “pretend officers” 
they secured an official license to travel to the Philippines. Before embarking they “confidently 
placed [their money] in the hands of the ship’s captain, who was used to carrying such things for 
various people.. .and a million gold scudus rode along that way despite the order [of Philip II]
133and a sender was obliged to pay the captain two scudos out of ever hundred.”
The restrictions on the size and number of ships allowed to sail annually to the 
Philippines was also routinely violated following the 1593 decree. In the same letter discussing 
the Peruvian merchants, Tello informed the king that three ships had arrived from New Spain, 
two of which were owned and operated by private individuals. He also noted that a five 
hundred-ton ship had been recendy built in Manila and was currently en route to Acapulco.134 In 
late 1599 and early 1600, a total of five ships from the Philippines made port at Acapulco, three 
o f which may have been privately owned commercial vessels. One of these ships, the Santo 
Tomas, was carrying two million pesos’ worth of silver when it wrecked two years later near 
Luzon. In 1601, the 1000-ton Santa Margarita was blown off course before being lost near the 
Mariana Islands on its return journey to Mexico. Spanish officials subsequently blamed its loss 
on severe overloading.135
This evidence suggests there was litde enforcement of the 1593 restrictions on
132 Blair and Robertson, Vol. X ,  “Letter from Governor Don Francisco Tello,” 250-251.
133 Francesco Carletti, My Voyage Around the World, 70. One scudos or escudos was roughly equivalent to 
two pesos, thus Carletti alleges that some two millions pesos left for Manila.
134 Blair and Robertson, Vol. X , “Letter from Governor D on Francisco Tello,” 249-250.
135 “The loss is attributed by some to disagreement amount the officers, and by others the late sailing o f  
the ships, and to a lack o f sailors, and (what is more nearly correct) to the general overloading o f the 
vessels.” Blair and Robertson, Vol. X II, “Principal Points in Regard to the Trade o f the Filipinas,” 46.
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transpacific trade. Colonial officials expressed as much to Philip II directly, telling him that any
attempt to do so was hopeless. In New Spain, Viceroy Velasco pushed instead for a loose
enforcement of the regulations. He was no doubt compelled to do so by the town council of
Mexico City, which continued to inform the king of the extent to which Mexican commerce
depended on the re-export of Asian wares.136 The lax enforcement of trade regulations allowed
the amount of silver leaving the New World to steadily increase through the last decade of the
sixteenth-century and the opening years of the seventeenth. By 1602, the Mexico City Cabildo
estimated that five million pesos left the Americas via the Manila-Acapulco run each year, with
three-fifths of this total originating in Peru.137 The figure of five million pesos, by far the largest
sum put forward by officials at the time, is significant in respect to the size of Spanish Adantic
silver flows during the early seventeenth-century. According to economic historian Richard
Garner, “around 1600 the Adantic remittances (reported as remittances to Castile) were running
138at more than 50 million pesos per quinquennium or more than 10 million per year.” Thus, the 
Cabildo’s estimate of transpacific trade placed the total value of silver been shipped to Asia at a 
little less than half of the amount flowing to Europe. In terms of trade, however, “the amount of 
silver [from Peru and New Spain] leaving Acapulco for Manila was [already by 1597] greater than 
the value of New Spain’s trade with Spain.”139
Despite new regulations, threats to the Seville Consulado’s commercial monopoly, 
Portuguese trade with Asia, and the finances of the Crown continued. With the death of Philip II
in 1598, the burden of empire fell on Philip III. In a 1603 report titled Trincipal Points in
Regard to the Trade of the Filipinas’ an unknown author informed the newly crowned monarch 
that along with Chinese textiles, imported goods from Asia such as “earthenware, wax, nails, and
136 Louisa Hoberman, Mexico's Merchant Elite, 215.
137 O.H.K. Spate, The Spanish Take, 201.
138 Richard Garner, “Where Did All the Silver Go?,” 56.
139 Peter Bake well, A. History of Latin America to 1825, Third Edition, 253.
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other merchandise” were contributing to a decline in Adantic commerce. As a result, “the 
commerce of Espana with Piru and Tierra Firme is ceasing, and merchandise from Espana is not 
sent to Piru.. .if this be not checked within a few years, it is agreed by all that the trade of Espana 
in merchandise with Tierra Firme, Piru, and Nueva Espana will cease.”140 The Bishop of Rio de 
la Plata likewise warned Philip III “in order that the Yndias may not be ruined, they should be 
dependent upon and subordinate to Espana, and there should be a close relationship between 
the different parts [of the Kingdom].” This dependence was threatened, however, by “the 
diversion of the commerce between the Yndias and Espana to other kingdoms, not belonging to 
his Majesty, but heathen and pagan; such as is now the case between Nueva Espana, Peru, and 
the Filipinas.” As a result, the wealth of New World “passes into the possession of the Chinese, 
and is not brought to Espana.”141
Coming on the heels of these reports was equally sobering news concerning commercial 
activity in Peru. In many respects, the two letters that the king received from the Viceroy Conde 
de Monterrey in 1603 were identical to those of Viceroy Canete a decade earlier. According to 
Monterrey, Spain’s trade with Peru was declining because of the excessive duties and long delays 
that had come to characterize Atlantic commerce. As a result, “the merchants of Lima, who were 
formerly very rich and had ample credit, have [now] become debtors; and this is the reason why 
the merchants of Seville do not make the same profits as formerly.” Commerce between Peru 
and New Spain on the other hand, “has increased greatly” and now “Peruvian merchants prefer 
to go the Nueva Espana to make their investments rather than to Espana.”
Monterrey went on to explain that the traffic between the two viceroyalties contained a 
high volume of Chinese goods and that lesser quality textiles imported from Asia were worn “by 
the very poor, and the negroes, and mulattoes (both male and female), sambahigos [sons of
140 Blair and Robertson, Vol. X II, “Principal Points in Regard to the Trade o f the Filipinas,” 46.
141 Blair and Robertson, Vol. XII, “Opinion o f Fray Martin Ignacio de Loyola,” 57.
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Indian men and African women], many Indians, and half-breeds, and this in great number.” 
Churches throughout the colony were also richly adorned in Chinese silk where “before, because 
of the inability to buy silks of Espana, [they] were very bare.” Monterrey closed with the standard 
plea to reopen direct trade between Peru and Manila. He argued that the traffic in Chinese wares 
was extremely beneficial to the Peruvian economy and could be equally lucrative for the royal 
treasury if the king were to sanction the commerce and collect duties on Asian im ports.142
Philip III scarcely considered allowing the expansion of transpacific trade beyond the 
Manila-Acapulco route. Nor did he seriously consider the option of allowing trade to be 
conducted beyond the limitations of 1593 despite the potential revenue from import duties. Like 
his father, Philip III was financially dependent on the continued flow of New World silver for 
servicing existing debt and contracting for new loans to risk a further and perhaps even larger 
inflow of Asian goods to the Americas. At the same time, Philip III had to safeguard Portuguese 
trade in Asia. For one, there was the meager income from the royal pepper monopoly and 
import taxes levied on the Cape route to preserve. More importandy, the king had to safeguard 
the ability of his Portuguese subjects to defend their commercial empire in Asia against growing 
English and Dutch threats. Doing so would in turn help to maintain the support of Lisbon 
merchants and the continued allegiance of Portugal to the Crown of Castile. Philip III, therefore, 
had little choice but to continue his father’s efforts to limit transpacific trade.
Regulating the Pacific
“It should not be lost sight of that New Spain is a colony which ought to be dependent on the mother-country. It 
requires great prudence to regulate this dependence and to see that the interest in its maintenance is mutual and
142 Blair and Robertson, Vol. XII, “Extracts from Two Letters from the Conde de Monterrey,” 57.
71
reciprocal\ fo r  it would cease the moment that the necessity was no longerfelt here fo r  European manufactures and 
other products. Juan Revillagigedo, viceroy of New Spain
In the three decades following the establishment of Spanish Manila, the complementary 
demand for silver in China and merchandise in Spanish America had transformed the vast 
Pacific into a vibrant commercial space. By 1604, millions of pesos’ worth of silver and goods 
moved annually between Asia and the Americas with trade remaining largely confined to the 
ports of Manila and Acapulco and limited to ‘Urdaneta’s Route’. However, Penalosa in Manila, 
Villamanrrique in New Spain, and even the Portuguese in Macao had each demonstrated that an 
expanded commercial network in the Pacific was not only possible but also commercially 
advantageous. It was this very expansion that the Crown had fought to prevent since Penalosa’s 
call in the early 1580s to develop direct trade between Manila and ports in Central and South 
America. Since then, transpacific commerce had increased to the point that it may have posed a 
legitimate threat to the Consulado’s hold on colonial markets, the Portuguese commercial empire 
in Asia, and the financial underpinning of the Crown of Castile.
In practice, Philip II’s regulations of 1593 had been an attempt by Spain to commercially 
isolate the New World from Asia. While these restrictions had largely failed, Philip III did not 
abandon the effort to safeguard the financial resources of his empire through commercial 
regulations. In 1604, the young king established a regulatory framework governing trade between 
the New World and Asia that was to remain nearly unchanged for the next two centuries.
The “Decree Regulating Commerce with Nueva Espana” issued in 1604, contained few 
restrictions on transpacific commerce that were not already in place. In this sense, Philip III was 
compiling and reissuing the many trade regulations that had been enacted over the previous two 
decades. The decree itself opened with a review of these laws, which according to the king had 
so far failed to “obviate the loss...to these kingdoms and to their trade and commerce” owing to
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them being ignored by “the citizens of Nueva Espana, Peru and other provinces... [with the full] 
knowledge and permission of my viceroys, and governors.” Having admonished colonial officials 
for their lax enforcement of regulations, the king followed by stating, “I should command the 
entire prohibition of the trade of the said Nueva Espana with the said Philipinas Islands.” 
Conceding that the termination of transpacific commerce would result in the eventual loss of the 
Philippines and an end to the spread of Catholicism in Asia, Philip III pulled back from an 
outright ban. Instead, he commanded that henceforth all regulations were to be strictly enforced, 
and that transgressors would suffer the “penalties without any exemption or remission.”143
Not content with simply enforcing existing trade laws or promising to prosecute those 
who violated them, Philip III ordered colonial officials to implement several new restrictions. 
From this point on, two, 200-ton ships were to annually ply the Pacific with the king stipulating 
“they shall be my vessels, and shall sail on my account...for in this way they will... [not] exceed this 
number and capacity.” With this order, Villamanrrique’s designs for a transpacific commercial 
space frequented by privately owned vessels and dominated by colonial merchants was laid to 
rest. Philip III specifically commanded that ships could no longer sail “on the account of private 
persons...[which] must without fail cease.” The Pacific was to be not just a Spanish lake but one 
controlled and traversed exclusively by royal vessels with private Spanish merchants and ships 
forbidden to operate independently in its waters.
To crack down on smuggling and the ability of Mexican and Peruvian merchants to 
travel to and from Manila, existing regulations pertaining to galleon officers and sailors were 
expanded. All crewmembers were barred from taking part in trade and were forbidden to load 
“any article whatsoever” on royal vessels engaged in transpacific crossings. The number of 
crewmen allowed to serve on each voyage was also capped on account of there frequently being 
many “artillerymen and sailors.. .who were not such” on past voyages. The governor of New
143 Blair and Robertson, Vol. XIII, “Decree Regulating Commerce with Nueva Espaha,” 256.
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Spain was in turn ordered to allow only those individuals planning on becoming citizens of the 
Philippines from traveling to Manila. Thus merchants like Carletti would no longer be able to 
serve as ‘pretend officers’ and accompany their valuable cargo either to or from Manila. Nor 
would ship captains be able to stow silver and merchandise for themselves or merchants.
The 1604 decree not only placed control over transpacific voyages squarely in the hands 
of the Crown, it set up an elaborate system for regulating the loading and unloading of all vessels 
sailing to and from Manila. A royal inspector and an accountant were commanded to accompany 
each voyage so that they might “keep account and system in everything. And they shall inspect 
the articles laded as merchandise, and carried back on return in the said ships, and account for 
them in their books.” To assist them in this duty, all merchandise being loaded in Manila was to 
be inspected and noted in the ship’s registry by members o f the royal exchequer. Once the 
galleons reached Acapulco “everything shall be again checked off, and appraised...and the proper 
measures shall be taken to ascertain and learn what has come registered, and whatever shall be 
found to have come without registry, and whatever is carried contrary to the said prohibition, 
shall be confiscated.” A similar system was devised for ships embarking from New Spain in 
order to limit the amount of silver leaving the Americas to 250,000 pesos a year. In closing,
Philip I l l ’s decree issued one last warning to his colonial officials. “And in all cases of remissness 
or carelessness which these my ministers shall display in the fulfillment and execution of said 
orders, I command that the penalties be executed against them, and the example which the affair 
demands shall be made.”144
The reaction to Philip I l l ’s decree in the New World and the Philippines was, like those 
o f his father, mixed. Transpacific smuggling of both silver and Asian goods remained rampant, 
as did the trade in Chinese wares between New Spain and Peru. Thus, despite the threats from 
Philip III, government officials on both ends of the trade network continued to collude with
144 Blair and Robertson, Vol. XIII, “Decree Regulating Commerce with Nueva Espaha,” 256.
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local merchants to thwart restrictions. There would be the occasional official who sought to 
enforce royal regulations to their full extent but they were few and far between and their impact 
on the overall nature of the trade was limited.145 More often than not, the wealth that could be 
had for simply turning a blind eye to royal regulations was too enticing for most to ignore. Trade 
with the Philippines in general was too valuable and the profits to be gained to high for such 
restrictions to be totally enforced or respected. In this way, the regulation of the Manila Galleon 
trade network was no different from the host of orders issued from Madrid throughout Spain’s 
history as an imperial power. The distance and time separating colonial viceroys from their 
sovereign meant that royal orders, when actually received, could be outdated, out of touch with 
the reality, or simply unenforceable for a variety of reasons. The prevailing attitude in Spain’s 
colonies was, wrote Schurz, seguarda la orden, pero no se cumple. “That is to say, royal orders were 
scrupulously respected, but not complied with.”146
Due to the high degree of smuggling throughout the history of the Manila Galleon, most 
historians have regarded Spanish efforts to control transpacific commerce as a failure. However, 
the significance of Spanish efforts to restrict trade between the New World and Asia is not to be 
found in the Crown’s constant battle against contraband goods. Rather, in spite of this illicit 
commerce the Crown achieved remarkable success in limiting the further development of the 
Manila Galleon trade network after 1604. While other variables including the fall of the Ming 
dynasty and the seventeenth century depression in Spanish America impacted transpacific trade, 
Philip I l l ’s regulatory policies worked effectively to contain this commerce. As a result, despite
145 The most prominent example o f an official enforcing the 1604 regulations to their full extent is Don  
Pedro de Quiroga y Moya. In 1637, Quiroga y Moya ordered the entire cargo o f two Manila Galleons to be 
inspected at Acapulco. Finding the cargo to be valued at four time the amount permitted he seized the 
majority o f the imported merchandise, “short changing the Manila merchants o f as much as 1,500,000 
pesos.” (178) For a full account o f this episode see William J. McCarthy, “Between Policy and Prerogative: 
Malfeasance in the Inspection o f the Manila Galleons at Acapulco, 1637,” Colonial Vatin American Historical 
Review 2, no. 2 (Spring 1993): 163-184.
146 William Schurz, The Manila Galleon, 399.
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the fact that smuggling continued to run rampant throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth- 
centuries, the Manila-Acapulco run remained the sole commercial route connecting Asia and the 
Americas. Privately owned commercial vessels were also excluded from the commerce and 
commercial voyages to and from Manila were held at around two per year. The success of these 
measures resulted in the total volume and value o f annual trade being capped by the amount of 
silver and merchandise that could be loaded on to two royal-owned and operated galleons. The 
only way to expand commerce was to illegally build larger vessels that could make the annual 
voyage. Despite the impressive size of some of Manila Galleons, over 1000 tons by the early 
1600s and upwards of 1500 to 2000 tons by the eighteenth-century, the amount of cargo that 
could be shipped was limited to what could be safely transported onboard two ships.
Even with commerce between China and the Americas being restricted in this way, the 
Consulado’s control of colonial markets would come under increasing attack over the course of 
the next two centuries. It would not be Asian imports that slowly diminished Seville’s trade with 
the New World however. Rather, European imports delivered by rival Dutch, English, French, 
and Portuguese merchants would be the main culprits. The same could be said for the 
Portuguese trading empire in Asia. The severe regulation of transpacific trade after 1604 may 
have prevented a further expansion of commerce between China and the New World but it did 
not prevent a gradual displacement of the Portuguese in Asia at the hands of rival European 
merchants. Nor did it secure Portugal’s control of the Cape route.
The regulatory policy instituted by Philip III in 1604, however, was not a panacea for 
securing the commercial and financial power of the Spanish-Portuguese empire. Like the series 
of trade regulations enacted by Philip II, the 1604 policies were a reaction to developments 
taking place half way around the world and were designed primarily to preserve exiting revenue 
streams from the New World. Primary sources reviewed here also indicate that it may have 
threatened the Portuguese commercial empire in Asia and Spanish-Atlantic trade with the New
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World. There is little doubt that members of the Consulado exaggerated the threat that Asian 
imports could wrest control of colonial markets from them and cause a substantial decline in 
Atlantic commerce. The Portuguese were also probably guilty of overstating the danger that 
transpacific trade posed to their commercial position in Asia. The actual extent of transpacific 
trade’s threat to the interests of both groups and the finances of the Crown of Castile remains 
unknown. It is clear that China, and Asia in general, could provide a substantial quantity of 
textiles, ceramics, spices, metal goods, and various luxury items to New World markets. Could 
the Manila Galleon network have also provided import substitutes for traditional European 
goods and foodstuffs or supplies of raw materials and slaves for use in the expanding mining and 
agricultural sectors of Spanish America? Providing a definitive answer to this question is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. Exploring what a more developed early modern Pacific commercial 
network could have looked like in the absence of Spanish regulation, however, can begin the 
process of answering this question.
An Early M odem  Pacific World?
Counterfactual exercises are poor substitutes for archival research. However, exploring 
the possibility of a more commercially developed early modern Pacific can help to begin the task 
of gauging the extent of transpacific trade’s threat to the Consulado’s hold over Spanish 
American markets. Doing so will also allow for the opportunity to examine economic, social, and 
political factors that could have worked for and against an expansion of the Manila Galleon trade 
network beyond levels in the early seventeenth-century. While large volumes of consumer goods 
flowed through Manila on their way to Acapulco at this time, Spanish American markets 
demanded more than simply textiles, ceramics, or spices. The economies of Spanish America 
were dependent on imported supplies of slaves, raw iron, metal tools, and, in the case of New
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Spain, mercury. The question is, could transpacific trade have delivered adequate and consistent 
supplies of such goods and did colonial merchants possess the means and impetus to expand 
trade with Asia in these and other commodities?
It is clear that the expansion of silver mining in the Americas beginning in the mid- 
1500s stimulated the growth and development of the wider colonial economy. The exchange of 
American silver for Asian wares in turn stimulated the development of transpacific trade after 
1571. The New World mining industry was, however, largely dependent on foreign imports of 
iron and steel and, by the early 1600s, mercury. The extraction of silver and gold ore required a 
steady supply of shovels, picks, crowbars and other tools. Iron was also needed for the 
construction of stamp mills to crush extracted silver ore in preparation for the amalgamation 
process. Most of the iron and steel used in New World mining industries during this period 
originated in the Basque country of Spain. Iron bars and steel tools, along with horseshoes, nails, 
hinges, and other items accompanied supplies of textiles, spices, and other luxury items that 
colonial merchants routinely shipped to backcountry mining centers.147
Despite the Basque provinces of Bizkaya and Gipuzkoa being well known for their iron 
deposits and foundries, Spanish iron production paled in comparison to that of China. In the 
eleventh-century, Chinese iron production is estimated at 125,000 tons, an output equal to that
143of Western Europe circa 1700. Production is believed to have declined following the Mongol 
invasion and collapse of the Song dynasty in the thirteenth-century but the extent of this decline 
and its duration remains debatable. As a result, there exists litde scholarly consensus or hard 
figures on Chinese iron production during the Yuan (1271-1368), Ming (1366-1644), or even 
Qing eras (1655-1912). Most historians believe that following the Mongol invasion, iron 
production did not fully recover until the Ming era. Total output may have reached 160,000 tons
147 Kris Lane, Quito 1599: City and Colony in Transition, 174-175.
148 Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence, 60.
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annually during this period, although some historians contend that Ming production was only 
around 45,000 tons, well bellow Song levels.149 Despite a lack of hard figures on production 
under the Qing, Donald Wagner argues that in the early 1700s the Chinese iron industry was still 
the largest and most efficient in the world.150 At this time, production may have reached 200,000 
tons a year.151 In comparison, Western European iron production totaled 40,000 tons in 1500,
124.000 tons in 1600, and 165,000 tons in 1700.152
While historians disagree over the total volume of production after the fall of the Song 
Dynasty, it is known that the Chinese iron industry had shifted southward by the Ming era. By 
the 1500s, the southern coastal provinces of Hunan, Guangdong, and Fujian were all major 
centers of production. The city of Foshan in Guangdong province for example, turned out
30.000 tons of worth of iron cookware, weapons, tools, and wire each year. These goods not
153only supplied local demand but were also exported throughout Southeast Asia.
The opening of direct trade with China therefore presented merchants in the New 
World who supplied mining centers with a second source of iron. The actual price of imported 
Asian iron in colonial markets is unknown but contemporaries noted its cheapness when 
compared to European supplies. Some of the first Chinese merchants to make contact with 
Spanish Manila in 1573 brought with them iron to trade and iron tools and bars are referred to 
frequently in primary documents as being available for purchase in the Philippines. Such goods 
also surface frequently in Manila Galleon shipments reaching Acapulco. The unknown author of 
Trincipale Points in Regard to the Trade of the Filipinas’ even singled out iron nails when
149 Tim Wright, “An Economic Cycle in Imperial China? Revisiting Robert Hartwell on Iron and Coal,” 
Journal of Economic &  Social History of the Orient (Dec 2007): 409-410.
150 Donald Wagner, “The State Ironworks in Zunhua, Hebei, 1403-1581,” Late Imperial China 26, no. 2 
(2005): 68.
151 Arnold Pacey, Techno log)) in World Civilisation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), 108.
152 Derek Alcroft and Anthony Sutcliffe, eds., Europe in the International Economy 1500 to 2000 (Cheltenhan, 
UK: Edward Elgar, 1999), 31.
153 Tim Wright, “An Economic Cycle in Imperial China?,” 409, 414.
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discussing the underselling of Spanish imports in the Americas. While there is no evidence 
pointing to a lack of iron in colonial mining centers during this period, it seems certain that if 
supplies of lower-priced iron were available they would have been bought by colonial merchants 
who regularly supplied mining centers.
Like most Asian commodities reaching Acapulco, the quantity of Chinese iron available 
in colonial markets is unknown. Supplies of the metal could and probably did on occasion serve 
as ballast for transpacific vessels but there is no evidence showing that Chinese iron was 
imported by the ton during the late 1500s or early 1600s. While the possibility of this occurring 
cannot by ruled out, the existence of a substantial transpacific trade in iron will remain sheer 
speculation until further research is conducted. To answer this and other questions raised here 
pertaining to Asian imports in Spanish America, future scholarship will need to examine 
sixteenth and seventeenth-century colonial merchant inventories and, in the case of Chinese iron, 
mining records.
Continued supplies of iron were crucial for the New World mining industry. Mercury 
however, was an even more vital input, a dearth of which could literally grind all production to a 
halt. Viceroy Martin Enriquez, who placed the distribution of mercury in New Spain under the 
control of the Crown in 1572, believed that “the sustenance of this land depends on the mines of 
silver, and they cannot be maintained without mercury.” Some four decades later Viceroy Luis 
de Velasco wrote that the “most important business that exists today in the Indies is the matter 
of quicksilver, for it is their principal support.”154 After iron tools and stamp mills had been used 
to excavate and grind down silver ore, mercury was required to separate the precious metal so 
that it could be melted into pure bars and ingots. A lack of mercury thus left the mine owners 
unable to bring to market much of the silver that had been successfully excavated.
154 Quoted in Peter Bakewell, Silver Mining and Society in Colonial Mexico (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 1971), 150.
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As evidenced by Viceroys Enriquez and Velasco, officials in both the New World and 
Spain were well aware of the dependency of silver production on steady supplies of mercury. 
During the late sixteenth and early seventeenth-centuries, there were three main sources of 
mercury available for use in the Americas. In central Peru lay the rich site of Huancavelica, in 
southern Spain the Fugger controlled site of Almaden, and finally Idria, located in modern day 
Slovenia. Up until the late 1500s, Huancavelica was able to supply all of Peru while production at 
Almaden was channeled almost exclusively to New Spain. The 1590s however, saw Huancavelica 
production peak and enter a slow secular decline.
The decline of Huancavelica mercury production was, according to Peter Bakewell, “in 
part the result of conscious efforts to reduce production.. .but it also derived from intrinsic 
difficulties in the mine which now began to appear and which were to become constantly 
greater.”155 The decrease in Huancavelica production forced officials in Spain to contract for the 
mining of mercury at Idria and to divert European supplies of quicksilver to Peru at the expense 
of New Spain. This in turn caused a shortage of mercury in Mexico, prompting Viceroy 
Cadereita to complain in 1636 that while miners in New Spain required an estimated 6,000 
quintals, the colony had received a paltry 634. Due to the lack of mercury, commerce in the 
colony is said to have been hit with “a great frost” and silver remittances originating from 
Zacatecas and the surrounding area having decreased by as much as two-fifths.'56
The potential o f a shortfall in mercury supplies, although routinely exaggerated by 
colonial officials, was thus real and the consequences of an actual dearth both immediate and far- 
reaching in terms of silver remittances to Spain and the overall health of colonial economies. For 
these reasons, government officials in the Philippines and the Americas continuously gauged the 
possibility of acquiring further supplies of mercury from sources outside of Huancavelica,
155 Peter Bakewell, Silver Mining and Society in Colonial Mexico, 155.
156 Peter Bakewell, Silver Mining and Society in Colonial Mexico, 164-165.
81
Almaden, and Idria. As early as 1592, Governor Desmarinas of the Philippines informed the 
King that mercury could be bought from Chinese merchants for a “satisfactory price [and in] 
whatever quantity is desired.” 157 Nothing seems to have come of this, for in 1601, following the 
decline in production at Huancavelica, Viceroy Valesco in Peru again raised the possibility of 
importing mercury from China, believing that considerable supplies could be had at 
comparatively lower prices. In 1605, a Mexican official wrote to the king after hearing that the 
rather unrealistic sum of 100,000 quintales of mercury was available for purchase in Canton. He 
went on to inform Philip III that 1,000 to 1,500 quintales (100 to 150 tons) could be shipped 
from Manila to Mexico at a “cost of 45 pesos 5 reales each, half the price of Spanish mercury
158sold in New Spain.”
The reports of readily available mercury in China prompted Spanish officials in the 
Philippines to request in 1610 that the Portuguese supply Chinese mercury to the colony. A deal 
was eventually reached and the Portuguese promised to sell the Spanish as much mercury as they 
desired at around 50 pesos a quintal. One Pedro de Angula Salazar subsequently traveled to 
Macao with some 25,000 pesos in hand and later received another 25,000 from Manila. An 
additional 75,000 pesos was later dispatched from New Spain but the actual quantity of mercury 
acquired by Salazar is unknown. At the time, Viceroy Marques de Salinas pleaded to the king for 
the legal value of transpacific trade to be increased from 250,000 to 500,000 pesos a year in order 
to allow for the importation of mercury from China.159 This implies that significant quantities of 
mercury may have been acquired by Spanish merchants in Manila, leading officials in New Spain 
to try and gain royal permission for the importation of quicksilver from Asia.
Despite these efforts, little mercury seems to have arrived through legal channels to the 
New World via Manila. Contraband trading could and probably did bring in small batches but
157 Blair and Robertson, Vol. VII, “A Letter from Luis Perez Dasmarinas to Felipe II,” 228.
158 Peter Bakewell, Silver Mining and Society in Colonial Mexico, 152.
159 George Souza, The Survival of Empire, 71-72.
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these would not have amounted to much. More research on the availability of mercury for 
export in China is required to assess whether or not transpacific trade could have offered a 
substantial and consistent supply of mercury to the New World mining industry. It is clear from 
the documentary record, though, that the prospect of importing Chinese quicksilver was met 
with strong opposition from Spain. Like all aspects of transpacific trade, purchasing mercury 
directly from China sparked fears over the continuing drain of American silver. The prospect of 
contracting with Portuguese traders was also met with concern. Spanish officials feared that 
Portuguese merchants would use the opportunity to import Asian wares into New World 
markets. The lack of a more developed trade in mercury between China and Spanish America 
has thus been explained by George Souza and Peter Bakewell as a consequence of the Crown’s 
unwillingness to lend support to the endeavor.160
An unrestricted Pacific commerce might have supplied New World mining centers with 
both iron and mercury from China. The obstacles to supplying Peru with relatively low weight 
wares such as textiles from Spain was great enough; one can hardly imagine the difficulty of 
crossing the Isthmus of Panama with a train of mules or laborers weighted down with steel tools, 
iron bars, and flasks of mercury. The shortage o f mercury in New Spain during the 1630s could 
have also been avoided through Chinese imports. To what extent this would have had on the 
overall health of the industry and the wider economy can never be known. These developments 
would have been largely dependent on an expansion in private commercial shipping along the 
lines that both Penalosa and Villamanrrique sought in the 1580s and 90s. If these efforts had met 
with success, the mining and refining industries of both China and the New World could have 
formed a closer, perhaps symbiotic, connection.
A transpacific trade of this kind, tying together mining industries in Asia and the
160 George Souza, The Survival of Empire, 71-72. Peter Bakewell, Silver Mining and Society in Colonial Mexico, 
152-153.
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Americas, would have relied on Spanish American merchants, perhaps aided by the Portuguese. 
On the one hand, merchants would have required the material and financial resources to 
construct ships capable of making regular voyages to and from Manila. Even before the 
colonization of the Philippines, several small but capable shipbuilding industries existed along 
the Pacific coastline of Spanish America, particularly at Guatulco and Guayaquil. By the late 
1500s, galleons were also being constructed at the Cavite yards near Manila. It was already 
possible to expand the number of vessels plying the Pacific. The majority of ships trading 
between New Spain, Panama, and Peru were privately owned, besides, either by merchants or 
ship captains, and there are numerous instances of privately owned vessels making the annual 
voyage to Manila as well. This indicates that some merchants did have access to the financial 
capital to purchase or construct ships for use in transpacific trade. It seems plausible that if the 
Crown and colonial officials had not restricted this trade, more would have done so.
On the other hand, transpacific crossings were fraught with danger. Not only was the 
return journey especially long and difficult due to Pacific wind patterns but attacks by European 
rivals, along with Chinese and Japanese pirates were always a potential threat. It is doubtful that 
merchants would have invested heavily in transpacific trade without the development of an 
elaborate convoy system similar to that which existed in the Atlantic. This would have decreased 
the risk of private ships and their cargo from being seized or lost at sea. In all likelihood, this 
would have required the establishment of colonial settlements along the California coastline with 
facilities capable of receiving and supplying ships returning from the Manila. The idea of 
establishing such a way station was actually floated in the late 1590s and the exploration of 
suitable bays took place shortly afterwards.161 Thus an expansion of transpacific trade could have 
prompted a tremendous acceleration in the spread of Spanish control and settlement of the
161 Blair and Robertson, Vol. X IV , “Decree Establishing a Way-Station for Philipine Vessels on the 
California Coast,” 182.
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Pacific coastline of North America. This would have undoubtedly taxed the resources of the 
Crown and the colony of New Spain. Nonetheless, the outline of a hypothetical Pacific World 
can clearly be seen emerging.
The development of a Pacific convoy system would have required more than simply an 
increase in the shipment of Asian supplies destined for New World mining centers. A further 
expansion of transpacific trade beyond the levels o f the 1590s would have been contingent 
largely on the continued demand for Chinese consumer goods. The seemingly inexhaustible 
desire of wealthy colonial subjects for luxury items and instances of Indian, Spanish, and free 
African laborers wearing Asian textiles is well known. Colonial markets were however, not 
immune from becoming glutted with imported wares. While contemporaries in favor of trade 
with Manila routinely discussed impressive sums o f revenue that could be had if only restrictions 
were relaxed, these were a best crude guesses and were undoubtedly widely inflated. As Garner 
has pointed out, “one is almost led to believe [from primary sources] that because of the mineral 
resources the market was virtually inexhaustible regardless of price or quality.” 162 In reality, 
though, markets were limited at the most basic level by the relatively low number of Spanish or 
mixed blood consumers and the ever-decreasing population of indigenous subjects during this 
period. The actual purchasing power of these groups also differed widely and just because some 
laborers were observed wearing imported silks does not make them regular consumers.
Despite what some contemporary observers believed about the potential of transpacific 
trade, there was a point at which colonial markets would have become saturated and any further 
imported goods gone unsold. What precisely this point was remains unknown, but it would have 
represented the limits to which transpacific trade could have expanded. It is worth noting that 
the value of Atlantic trade may have risen throughout the 1600s despite a decrease in overall 
tonnage and “a growing fraction of it consisted] of high value, low volume” goods that could
162 Richard Garner, “Where Did All the Silver Go?,” 80.
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not be produced in the Americas.163 Thus, while the colonial market for Chinese goods was 
never unlimited, it could have expanded modestly during the seventeenth-century.
Research on the importance of Asian imports and the workings of the colonial market in 
general is limited for the period in question. As a result, knowledge concerning the actual 
demand for and distribution of Asian or European imports for that matter is severely lacking. 
Jane Mangan’s much appreciated work on the economy and society of colonial Potosi however, 
has revealed the intricacies of the urban marketplace in colonial Latin America. Within these 
commercial spaces, Spanish, Creole, indigenous, and African men and women played the role of 
both consumers and suppliers of local and imported goods.164 Further research along these lines 
and for locales other than prominent mining centers would thus go along way in assessing the 
consumption patterns and purchasing power of colonial consumers.
The viability of an early modern Pacific World also rests on the extent to which colonial 
merchants sought ever-expanding sums of commercial profit as opposed to operating under a 
more commercially conservative strategy of rent seeking. This leads to the familiar debate over 
the degree to which the entrepreneur spirit existed in the colonial and wider Spanish social milieu 
of the period. In regards to the latter, even a cursory reading of primary and secondary sources 
reveals a wide range of individuals from various socioeconomic status who showed the 
wherewithal and commercial acumen to pursue and develop a wide range of commercial 
ventures. Thus, as Bakewell has argued in his study of seventeenth-century Potosi “millionaire” 
Antonio Lopez de Quiroga, the “impressions of backwardness, conservatism, and enervation in 
Hispanic business belong more to Spain itself than to the colonies [and in] America, 
entrepreneurship was by no means rare.. .and had in reality been a marked feature of colonial life
163 Peter Bakewell, A. Histoiy of Latin America to 1825, Third, 301-302.
164 Jane Mangan, Trading Roles.
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from the conquests onwards.” 165
Even if colonial merchants engaged in transpacific trade are to be classified as 
entrepreneurs, this does not preclude them from having used their commercial success in pursuit 
o f rents. In short, having profited from the importation or distribution of Asian wares, 
individuals could and probably did devote considerable financial sums to gaining control over 
land, mines, and other natural or agricultural resources. Many would have also decided to forgo 
further commercial interests and instead pursue political and social standing through titles of 
nobility or positions in local government. The degree to which merchants actively pursued rent 
seeking and social standing would thus have gone a long way in determining the extent to which 
transpacific trade would have increased in the absence of government suppression.
As Braudel observed of early modern European merchants, such individuals did not 
operate solely under “a mentality made up of calculation, reason, cold logic, a lack of normal 
feelings, all subordinated to an unbridled appetite for gain.” 166 The same could be said for 
colonial merchants in the New World. As both Spanish subjects and Christians, they possessed 
considerable social, political, and cultural ties to their sovereign, motherland, and faith. Such ties 
impacted the decision-making process when it came to commerce with Asia. Evidence of the 
first two can be found in the numerous instances of merchants appealing to Philip II and III 
directly or through colonial officials for the legal expansion of transpacific trade. Merchants in 
Peru even proposed to Philip II that they pay a larger import tax on Asian goods in exchange for 
the right to trade with the Philippines. Despite the high degree of contraband trading in the 
Pacific, merchants were not as cavalier as one might think when disobeying the wishes of their 
king. They often worked, rather unsuccessfully, through legal channels to expand commerce with 
Asia. There was also undoubtedly tension surrounding continued trade with ‘infidels7 like the
165 Peter Bakewell, Silver and 'Entrepreneurship in Seventeenth-Century Potosi (Albuquerque, NM: University of 
New Mexico Press: 1988), 172.
166 Fernand Braudel. The Wheels of Commerce: Civilisation and Capitalism 15th-18th Century, Vol. II, 401.
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Chinese or New Christian Portuguese and the risk that such commerce posed to the continued 
power of the Catholic King and Christendom itself. To date, however, with the exception of 
Borah’s Early Colonial Trade and Navigation Between Mexico and Peru and Louisa Hoberman’s 
Mexico’s Merchant Elite, few in depth studies of colonial merchants for the period in question 
exists. Even less is known about those operating primarily in inter-colonial Pacific or transpacific 
trade.
As the development of Atlantic World historiography has shown, the creation of 
commercial networks linking continents and societies entails more than simply the exchange of 
resources and goods but the movement of people, ideas, and tastes as well. As of the present, 
few scholars with the exception of Edward Slack in the recent article “The Chinos in New 
Spain” have focused on the movement of people from Asia to the Americas along the Manila 
Galleon trade route. As Slack has demonstrated, there were a substantial number of Chinese, 
Japanese, Filipino, and Indian immigrants to New Spain during the early years o f transpacific 
trade. Some were brought by Spanish and Portuguese merchants as personal servants, others as 
slaves who may have numbered around 600 a year throughout the first decade of the 
seventeenth-century.167 Filipinos and Chinese also served aboard Spanish ships and in fact 
constituted the majority of transpacific sailors, sixty to eighty percent, by the early 1600s.
After arriving in Acapulco, few Chinos seem to have chosen to return to Asia, preferring 
instead to settle in New Spain. Once in the Americas, many married indigenous, free and 
enslaved African women and “farmed rice (brought from the Philippines), corn, and cotton; 
tended cacao and coconut palm tress; fished in the seas and rivers; and transported people and 
goods to various ports along the coastline.” 168 Chino immigrants involved in palm tree 
cultivation even created a palm wine industry in New Spain. By 1619, the beverage had
167 J.I. Israel, Race, Class, and Politics in Colonial Mexico, 75-76.
168 Edward Slack, “The Chinos in New Spain: A Corrective Lens for a Distorted Image,” Journal of World 
Histoiy 20, no. 1 (March 2009): 39.
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reportedly become very popular with natives and posed a threat to the sale of imported wine
169from Spain. Other Asian immigrants settled in urban centers throughout Mexico and took up 
artisan trades, becoming blacksmiths, cobblers, tailors, and even vendors and barbers. The large 
number of Chinese barbers in Mexico City led to an official complaint being lodged in 1635 with 
the local cabildo. The cabildo recommended to the Viceroy that Chinese barbers be expelled 
from the city center and their number limited to twelve.170 What little is known concerning chino 
immigration leaves open the possibility that unrestricted transpacific trade could have led to a 
larger inflow of Asian immigrants or slaves and with them a cultural exchange akin to that which 
took place in the Atlantic.
Specific factors such as the material demands of the New World mining industry, the 
size of colonial markets, the disposition of colonial merchants towards rent seeking, and the 
inflow of chino immigrants could have worked both for and against a further expansion of 
transpacific trade. Other economic and political forces, though, would have had an equal if not 
greater impact. While Borah’s rather dismal view of Spanish American seventeenth-century 
economic decline has since been revised, a decrease in the New World’s transoceanic commerce 
did take place. In regards to trade with China, Richard von Glahn estimates that 326 tons of 
silver flowed to the country from Manila during the first decade of the seventeenth century.
From this high point, the amount steadily fell, hitting a low of 8.6 tons in the 1660s before rising 
steadily to a little over 100 tons in the 1690s.171
While American silver production did decrease between 1630 and 1700 due to a decline 
in production at Potosi, the cause for such a precipitous falling off of trade with China is not to 
be found solely in the workings of the colonial economy. Rather, it was China that was in fact
169 Blair and Robertson, Vol. 18, “Relation by Captain Sebastian de Pineda, on matters relating to the 
Filipinas Islands,” 175-176.
170 Homer Dubs and Robert Smith, “Chinese in Mexico City in 1635,” The F'ar East Quarterly 1, no. 4 
(1942): 387.
171 Richard von Glahn, Fountain of Fortune, 232.
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undergoing severe economic decline and political instability during this period. Following the
sack of Beijing and the death of the last Ming Emperor in 1644, several provinces, including
Fujian and Guangdong, resisted subordination to the newly established Qing dynasty for two
decades. This, in conjunction with the onset of an economic depression in 1661, may have
* « 172contributed to a severe decline in China’s trade with Manila. It is worth noting however, that 
Richard von Glahn argues the “decline in official trade between China and the Philippines after 
1620 most likely was offset by a proliferation of illicit trade on a scale comparable to the peak
] 7 3  i tyears o f the official trade.” Therefore, transpacific commerce may have weathered the political 
and economic instability of the seventeenth century as well if not better than Spanish Atlantic 
trade.
Precipitating and in fact contributing to the possible decrease in transpacific trade and 
the fall of the Ming dynasty however, was the global convergence of bimetallic ratios — the 
exchange rates between silver and gold. By the early 1640s, the value of silver in China had 
decreased substantially and was roughly equivalent to the going rate in Europe.174 Thus, even in 
the absence of heavy regulations limiting transpacific trade, commerce between China and the 
New World would have been severely strained by the decline in the value of silver in Asia, the 
decrease in American silver production, and the political and economic instability that engulfed 
China during the mid seventeenth-century. By the opening of the 1700s, however, these trends 
had slowed and were soon moving in reverse. Following the return of political stability, 
population levels in China began to rise, driving economic expansion and an increase in demand
172 Richard von Glahn, “Myth and Reality of China’s Seventeenth Century Monetary Crisis,” The Journal of 
Economic History 56, no. 2 (June, 1996): 441.
173 Richard von Glahn, “Myth and Reality of China’s Seventeenth Century Monetary Crisis,” 440.
174 Dennis Flynn and Arturo Giraldez, “Cycles of Silver,” 395.
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for silver around the turn of the eighteenth-century. As a result, the price of silver in Canton
175exceeded that of Europe by some fifty percent in the early 1700s.
While the value of silver in China remained high during the eighteenth-century, silver 
production in the Americas, specifically the colony of New Spain, increased. Owning to the 
immense reserves of Potosi, Peru had dominated New World silver production throughout the 
1500s and well into the seventeenth-century. By the late 1600s, however, New Spain accounted 
for roughly half of all silver output in Spanish American, approximately 3.9 million out of 8.3 
million pesos annually. Except for a brief fall in production levels in the 1760s, Mexican output 
continued to surge, rising from 10.2 million a year in the 1720s to 23.1 million in the 1790s.
South American production expanded throughout the eighteenth-century as well but grew by 
only 250 percent compared to an increase of 600 percent in New Spain.176
Compared to levels around the turn of the seventeenth-century, silver production was 
not the only economic indicator of New Spain to have shown a substantial increase. The 
combined European, indigenous, and mixed blood population of New Spain stood at an 
estimated 2.5 million in 1600. By 1700, it had risen to 4.5 million and would reach 6.5 million by 
the opening of the nineteenth-century.177 Therefore, as Mexican silver production expanded so 
to did its population. While a rise in population does not correspond directly to an increase 
consumer demand, there is little doubt that the market for Asian commodities in New Spain was 
greater in the 1700s. than the late sixteenth century. Throughout the eighteenth-century in fact, 
Mexican officials placed the value of silver shipped annually to China at three to four million
175 “A fifty percent premium [on silver] existed this time, rather than the one hundred percent premium 
during the 1540-1640 period.” Dennis Flynn and Arturo Giraldez, “Cycles of Silver,” 395.
176 John Fisher, “Mining and Imperial Trade in Eighteenth Century Spanish America,” in Global Connections 
and Monetary History, 123-124.
177 Angus Maddison, The World Economy, Volumes 1-2 (Paris: Organization for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development, 2006), 235, 270.
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pesos (75-100 tons) .178 These figures, like those of sixteenth-century officials, are questionable
and the real value of trade was probably lower. However, even if these figures were inflated, the
possibility remains that transpacific trade levels had increased modesdy over Garner’s low
estimate of 700,000 and Flynn and Giraldez’s high of two millions pesos per year in the 1590s.
Therefore, despite seventeenth century political instability and a fall in the value of silver
in China, conditions on both ends of transpacific trade routes were advantageous for commerce
after 1700. China resumed its status a silver sink for much of the eighteenth-century while New
Spain’s silver production surged and population levels steadily increased after 1700. Furthermore,
despite the fact that Philip I l l ’s regulatory policy of 1604 remained in place and transpacific trade
was limited to two vessels a year, the eighteenth-century economies of China and New Spain
showed a remarkable degree of interconnectedness. William Schell has even argued that there
existed a silver symbiosis between China and Mexico throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth-
centuries. This “Sino-Mexican symbiosis entered its fullness as China’s population and domestic
economy recovered and Mexico replaced Peru as the world’s major silver producer” in the 
1791700s. One is left to wonder to what extent this relationship could have developed under a 
less restrictive regulatory system throughout the early modern period.
Ultimately, the question of whether or not transpacific trade would have increased in the 
absence of government suppression is unanswerable. The outline of what an early modern 
Pacific world could have looked like, though, points to the possibility that further expansion was 
possible. Despite the feasibility of a more developed economic relationship between Asia and the 
New World, the argument put forward by various colonial officials that this would have caused a 
collapse of Adantic trade must still be regarded as a gross exaggeration. Sixteenth-century
178 Richard von Glahn, “Money Use in China and Changing Patterns of Global Trade” in Global Connections 
and Monetary History, 195.
179 William Schell Jr., “Silver Symbiosis: ReOrienting Mexican Economic History,” Hispanic American 
Historical Kevien> 81, vol. 1 (February 2001J: 105.
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transpacific commerce was a threat to the sale of some European imports in colonial markets. It 
was not an existential threat to Atlantic commerce. In terms of specific goods such as textiles 
and ceramics, cheaper and by some accounts finer quality Chinese imports could have spoiled 
the market for their European counterparts. The same could have also occurred for jewelry, 
devotional pieces, furniture, mercury, iron and other wares.
However, there were things China, and Asia in general could not have supplied to New 
World markets in quantities large enough to meet total demand. Chief among these were slaves. 
While there was a limited traffic in chino slaves during this period the totals never came close to 
matching the number of African slaves delivered to the Americas by Portuguese merchants. Like 
mercury, foreign supplies of bondsmen were vital to the colonial economies of the New World 
by the late 1500s. As the indigenous population levels continued to decline throughout the first 
half of the seventeenth century, this dependence on imported labor only increased. While it is 
possible that an increase in chino slave trading could have helped meet the growing demand in 
colonial markets for laborers, it is highly unlikely that transpacific commerce could have eclipsed 
the Atlantic slave trade. By the late 1590s, over 2800 African slaves a year were arriving in
| gQ
Spanish America annually, surpassing 3800 a year after the mid seventeenth century.
The significant cultural ties between Europe and the New World would likely have also 
mitigated a drastic falling off of Atlantic commerce. Colonial elites were primarily oriented 
towards European society and would have continued, for example, to ape the latest fashion 
trends of the metropole. Thus, even if Chinese silk and perhaps Indian cotton had come to 
dominate colonial markets, there would have remained a demand for Dutch linens, Rouen cloth, 
and various decorative trimmings produced in European textile centers. Along with these goods, 
Asian merchants would have also been unable to provide import substitutes for traditional 
European foodstuffs such as “wine, brandy, flour, olive oil, preserved fruits, [and] nuts.” Despite
180 Philip D. Curtin, The Atlantic Slave, 25.
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the fact that colonial palates became increasingly creolized over time, Atlantic traffic in the above
181items continued to be lucrative throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth-centuries.
Finally, an expansion of transpacific trade would have been constrained by the fact that
besides silver bullion, colonial Spanish American laborers produced little that Asian merchants
desired. Although mining remained the dominant economic activity within Spanish America,
there were other export-oriented industries that saw significant development during the colonial
period. Sugar for example, was one of the first colonial products to be exported to Europe and it
remained an extremely profitable transatlantic commodity throughout the early modern period.
Dyes were another colonial product that found a ready market in Europe. The export of both
indigo and cochineal from New Spain each surpassed half a million pesos a year by the opening
182of the seventeenth-century. Finally, other products such as tobacco, hides, and cacao would 
have also continued to attract European merchants to Spanish American ports along the Adantic 
seaboard for the duration of the early modem period.
In short, the demand for African slaves, colonial exports other than silver, and cultural 
ties to Europe would have prevented a drastic decrease in Atlantic commerce from occurring. 
Instead, a more likely outcome of a less regulated Manila Galleon trade network would have 
been a greater degree of specialization in the foreign trade of the New World. Colonial 
production would have followed global trade routes to the markets where it was valued the most. 
Increasing supplies of silver would have flowed across the Pacific to the Chinese sink in 
exchange for ceramics, spices, silk thread, finished textiles, possibly mercury and iron, and other 
various consumer goods. The total amount of New World silver being shipped directly to Asia 
would, however, have been contingent on the demand for Asian goods in colonial markets.
181 Peter Bakewell, A  History of Latin America to 1825, Third Edition, 363.
182 Peter Bakewell, A  History of Latin America to 1825, Third Edition, 235-237.
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Sugar, dyes, tobacco and other colonial commodities, along with still significant supplies of 
silver, would, on the other hand, have continued to gravitate towards Europe.
Therefore, even in the absence of the Crown’s severe regulation of transpacific trade, 
Mexico was unlikely to become the “center of the world.” Nor would the New World “come to 
have no need of Hespana” or the European wares and African slaves that Sevillean and 
Portuguese merchants dealt in. However, the expansion of transpacific trade beyond the levels 
obtained in the late 1500s could have broken the Consulado’s hold on colonial markets. AsJ
argued here, this would have dealt a severe blow to the already tentative finances of the Crown 
of Castile and with them, the seventeenth century global empire of Spain. The further 
development o f the Manila Galleon trade network after the 1590s could have also led to a greater 
degree of economic interdependence between Asia and the America, specifically China and New 
Spain after 1700.
Conclusion
By adopting a global market framework and drawing from various historical subfields, 
this paper has sought to frame the opening of transpacific trade as a global event. The flow of 
American silver and Asian wares across the Pacific in the late 1500s altered global trade routes 
and patterns of consumption and production in Asia and the New World. Rather than provide a 
commercial windfall to Spain, access to the fabled riches of Cathay quickly proved to be 
nightmare for the commercial interests of the Sevillean Consulado and for the royal treasury. To 
a lesser extent, it may have also posed a threat to the Asian commercial empire of the 
Portuguese, after 1580 subject to Spanish crown authority. The Manila Galleon trade network 
was one of many threats to Castilian hegemony in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth- 
centuries. But unlike political challenges such as the revolt of the Spanish Netherlands, Turkish
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advances in the Mediterranean or the problem of England, the opening o f transpacific commerce 
had truly global implications.
Viewed in this light, current scholarship on the Manila Galleon trade network in the late 
sixteenth-century prompts as many questions as it provides answers. It is clear that transpacific 
commerce had a significant impact on global trade flows and with them, Spanish imperial 
policymaking. What remains unclear is the extent of the trade’s affect on these and other 
historical developments throughout Spanish America, Eurasia, Africa, and the global trading 
world in general. While major shortcomings of Manila Galleon historiography have been 
touched upon already, they will be revisited here in order to map out a more comprehensive and 
interdisciplinary research plan.
First, the historiography o f the Manila Galleon must be reevaluated in light of recent 
developments in economic history and world-systems analysis. The debate over a European 
versus Asian-centered early modern world economy remains unresolved. It is clear, however, 
that the last two decades have witnessed significant changes in the ways historians conceptualize 
global trade patterns and economic development during this period. Dennis Flynn and Arturo 
Giraldez’s research on silver flows and that of Richard von Glahn on the Ming dynasty’s 
monetary policy, has demonstrated the central place of China within the early modern silver 
trade. Andre Gunder Frank’s sinocentric model of the early modern global economy and 
Kenneth Pomeranz’s great divergence thesis have also complicated historical understandings of 
the rise of the west and called into question Eurocentric interpretations of world history. In 
response to these historiographical and methodological developments, the work of Borah,
Schurz, Spate and others on transpacific trade must be reexamined. Rather than approach this 
historiography from an Asian or sinocentric standpoint, though, scholars should adopt a global 
market framework that focuses on the complementary demand for commodities that existed 
between sixteenth-century markets in Asia and Spanish America.
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Despite the need to reassess the historiography of the Manila Galleon, this body of 
research provides a strong foundation on which to build a more comprehensive understanding 
of the Manila Galleon commercial network. To move forward, however, requires careful 
consideration of how present knowledge of early modern global economic structures both 
complicate and challenge the work of twentieth century scholars. To what extent for example, 
did the assumption of European economic superiority vis-a-vis Asia lead earlier historians to 
downplay the impact of transpacific trade on historical developments in Spanish America or the 
threat that this commerce posed to the Consulado’s dominance of colonial markets? In contrast 
to earlier scholars, by interpreting widely available and heavily cited primary sources within a 
global market framework, this study has shown that these fears may have been genuine. To use 
but one of many examples from the historiography of the Manila Galleon, O.H.K. Spate’s 
characterisation of the warnings over transpacific trade as “vastly exaggerated” claims from 
“enemies of the [Manila] Galleon and the New Spain-Peru trade” can no longer be uncritically 
accepted.183
Embracing recent developments in global economic history and world-systems analysis 
is also the first step towards globalizing the history of the Manila Galleon beyond silver flows. 
Among other developments, the early modern period saw a substantial growth in the volume and 
value o f long distance trading. In Spanish America, the development of transpacific trade helped 
to transform colonial markets into sites of global consumption where consumers could choose 
between European, Asian, and thanks to Portuguese transatlantic trade, African commodities. 
Understanding the larger forces at work in facilitating and shaping Asian-American trade and 
Spanish American economic development in general, demands that knowledge of global 
economic structures be incorporated into future research. Therefore, like prior research, archival 
sources pertaining to the Manila Galleon need to be examined within a global economic
183 O.H.K. Spate, The Pacific Since Magellan, 226.
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framework that recognizes the economic weight of Asia in general and China specifically 
throughout the early modem period.
As this paper has demonstrated, interpreting primary sources using a global market 
framework elevates the opening of transpacific trade to a level of global significance that earlier 
historians, with the recent exception of Flynn and Giraldez, either downplayed or failed to 
recognize. Again, the research presented here is based on a very narrow survey of primary 
documents. Therefore, the vast majority of archival sources that past historians utilized when 
conducting research on the Manila Galleon await revisiting. However, a large portion of these 
sources were official Spanish documents housed in the Archivo General de Indias. While these 
sources may yield further insights into the Manila Galleon trade network, colonial archives in 
Latin America offer the most promising potential for future research. In particular, notary 
records pertaining to colonial merchant activity represent a voluminous but little utilized source. 
These records, which frequently contain commercial inventories or detail short-term contracts 
between merchants, can shed light on the extent and impact of the trade in and consumption of 
Asian imports in Spanish America.
In particular, notary records could potentially identify the precise type and even quantity 
of Asian goods reaching New World markets. This knowledge would go a long way in offering a 
more balanced understanding of transpacific trade in contrast to the current focus on silver flows 
to Asia. While silver played a central role in transpacific commerce, it represents only one side of 
the story. Any bullion that entered the Chinese silver sink was exchanged for other commodities. 
Despite the fact that William Schurz called “the manifest lists of the [Manila] galleons a veritable 
catalogue of the products of the Orient,” knowledge concerning the variety and quantity of 
Asian goods arriving at Acapulco remains scarce.184 Goods exported to the New World from 
the Philippines were rarely registered on an individual basis. Instead, merchants listed the total
184 William Schurz, The Manila Galleon, 31.
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number of packets being shipped aboard each vessel and declared to government officials only 
the total value of merchandise contained in each. Upon their arrival to the New World, these 
packets were seldom opened or inspected.
As a result of these practices, records detailing the specific type and quantity of Asian 
merchandise arriving to Acapulco and other American ports are exceedingly rare. The illicit 
nature of transpacific trade and the degree to which both colonial merchants and some officials 
sought to obscure commerce with Asia also makes any effort to illuminate the contents of east 
bound cargoes inherently difficult. Clearly, there exists no shortage of obstacles to overcome 
concerning research on Asian imports in the markets of colonial Spanish America. However, the 
heavy reliance of past historians on sources housed in the Archivo General de Indias may have 
limited their efforts to present a more detailed picture of Asian imports. Therefore, future 
research based on notary records could offer a more detailed assessment of the variety and 
quantity of wares that were shipped to the New World via the Manila Galleon trade network. 
Merchant inventories and contracts also have the potential to gauge the average price of Asian 
wares compared to similar merchandise imported from Europe. This could, in turn, help to 
gauge the actual extent to which Asian imports threatened to undermine the sale of merchandise 
delivered by transatlantic trade and the merchants of Seville.
Notary records also have the potential to shed light on the impact o f transpacific trade 
on inter-Pacific commerce in sixteenth and early seventeenth-century Spanish America. The 
internal dynamics of colonial markets and trade during this period in particular represents a little 
investigated area of colonial Latin American history. Although a pioneering study, Woodrow 
Borah’s Early Colonial Trade and Navigation Between Mexico and Peru, was able to present only 
tentative conclusions and failed to spark sustained research on the subject. Along with Borah, 
various twentieth-century historians, including James Lockhart and William Schurz, argued that 
the opening of transpacific trade marked both a quantitative and qualitative change in this
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commerce. Short of estimating the value o f silver flowing northward from Peru to Acapulco or 
offering anecdotal evidence, however, these scholars were unable to put forward comprehensive 
research that illuminated these changes.
Further research on inter-Pacific colonial commerce using notary documents could help 
to gauge the impact of the Manila Galleon network on colonial trade patterns and merchant 
activity. It could help reveal the extent that colonial commerce expanded as a result of Asian 
commodities and identify what regional markets these goods were predominantly consumed in. 
Future research, however, should not focus primarily on estimating the value and volume of this 
commerce. While more precise data on trade levels between New Spain and Peru is required 
there are a host of questions concerning qualitative changes that remain unanswered. First 
among these is whether or not sixteenth-century transpacific and inter-Pacific trade was 
dominated by factors for Sevillean firms or independent colonial merchants. Again, past 
historians have noted that the growth in inter-Pacific commerce gave rise to independent 
colonial merchants who specialized in buying both European and, after 1571, Asian imports at 
Acapulco. To what extent these merchants actually dominated inter-Pacific trade and altered 
colonial trade patterns, however, remains unknown. Focusing on inter-Pacific commerce and the 
impact of transpacific trade on colonial merchant activity thus has the potential to ‘globalize’ this 
area of Latin American historiography by revealing how Spanish American merchants dealt in 
global commodities and shifted resources between transpacific, transatlantic, and inter-Pacific 
trade routes.
A focus on colonial notary records could help to augment knowledge o f sixteenth- 
century credit markets in Latin America. The financing of transatlantic trade for the period 
examined here was dominated primarily by resident Genoese merchants in Seville whose 
commercial networks also extended to the New World. From their position on both ends of 
Atlantic trade routes they dispensed capital to merchants on a short-term basis and at interests
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rates between fifty and ninety percent. How, by whom, and at what rates inter-colonial and 
transpacific trade was financed is less well known. The more successful merchants of Mexico 
City and Lima did provide credit for such commerce but prior to the founding of Spanish 
Manila, the availability of capital for inter-Pacific colonial commerce was undoubtedly limited in 
comparison to transatlantic trade. The rapid expansion of transpacific commerce after 1571, 
however, may have led to a significant expansion in capital stocks, specifically those of successful 
merchants in Mexico City and Lima. The affect of transpacific commerce on the availability of 
capital in the New World during the late sixteenth-century thus represents yet another aspect of 
colonial Latin American historiography that has remained largely undeveloped.
Although the research here has focused overwhelmingly on the economic and policy 
ramifications of the Manila Galleon trade network, there were social and cultural repercussions 
that await further exploration. Jane Mangan’s use of colonial notary records has shed light on the 
structure and day-to-day workings of Potosfs urban marketplace. Her work has also 
demonstrated that trade and consumption played a crucial role in the formation of colonial 
identities. The purchase of Asian over European imports by various New World consumers was 
therefore a decision that hinged on more than simply price differentials. Those who bought 
Asian goods did so for various reasons and must have seen in such consumption a way of 
defining themselves within colonial society. The introduction of Asian motifs, whether on 
textiles, ceramics, jewelry, or furniture, also came to exercise a documented influence on New
185World artists and craftsman. Therefore, not only do notary records have the potential to 
increase our understanding of how transpacific trade impacted colonial commerce and merchant 
activity, they could also help reveal the social and cultural significance of Asian merchandise to 
colonial consumers in Spanish America.
185 See Donna Pierce, ed., Asia &  Spanish America: Trans-Pacific Artistic and Cultural Exchange, 1500-1850 
(Denver, CO: Denver Art Museum, 2000).
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In closing, it is clear that there exists a strong need for further research on the immediate 
impact of the Manila Galleon trading network on historical developments above and beyond 
Pacific silver flows. Whether the focus is on Spanish imperial policymaking, merchant activity, or 
the various social and economic aspects involved in the production and consumption of 
commodities, future research needs to be pursued within a global framework. As advocated here, 
not only should scholars approach questions regarding transpacific trade from a global 
standpoint, they should do so focusing on the complementary demand for silver in China and 
consumer goods in Spanish America. The wearing of Chinese silk by Spanish, Creole, African, or 
indigenous men and women throughout the Americas or the use of the real de a ocho by Chinese 
merchants and peasants, .implicated such individuals direcdy in the ongoing expansion of the 
early modern global economy. As the early history of the Manila Galleon demonstrates, this 
economic expansion both shaped and was shaped by the actions of merchants, consumers, and 
government officials throughout Asia, the Americas, and Europe. Along with questions 
concerning the specific impact of transpacific trade on early modem social, political, and 
economic developments, to what extent the actions of individuals inhibited or aided the 
development transpacific commerce awaits to be discovered.
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